북한의 대중 석탄수출에 대한 유엔 안보리 분야별 제재의 한계

Abstract

Challenging the conventional arguments that the effectiveness of sanctions on North Korea is decided by China’s political will, this article examines that economic factors such as the demand, supply and expectations in the market might limit the implementation of sanctions on North Korea. UN Security Council Resolution(UNSCR) 2270, adopted in 2016, was the first to introduce sectoral sanctions on North Korea’s mineral exports. Considering that North Korea’s export of mineral resources accounted for more than 40% of its total trade revenues at the times, it was expected that the sectoral sanctions on coal export would have the effect of blocking the inflow of funds into North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. However, contrary to these expectations, North Korean anthracite export to China increased. UNSCR 2321, a subsequent resolution of UNSCR 2270, put a cap on the volume or amount of North Korean anthracite coal imports to UN member states, this cap increased the demand for Chinese importers to prepare for future supply reductions, which in turn led to an increase in both the price level and quantity of North Korean anthracite imports. Therefore, we can confirm that there are limits originating from market dynamics to the implementation of sectoral sanctions on North Korea, especially when we put the demand side into consideration. This suggests that when the international community adds the goal of full implementation to the North Korea sanctions regime, there must be a policy that meets the demand for the targeted goods.