‘조선 조정의 왜구 회유책’론에 대한 비판적 검토 －태조 6년(1397) 항왜 도주와 군관 처벌의 배경을 중심으로－

Abstract

Nakaon(羅可溫) Waegu group (or Wakou or Japanese marauders; 倭寇) surrendered to the Joseon Government in December 1396, but fled to Tsushima twice at the end of the same year and in April 1397. The purpose of this paper is (i) to confirm who initiated the attacks against the surrendered Waegu by reviewing the backgrounds of their escapes and the subsequent punishment of Joseon‘s military officers, and (ii) to reassess the currently prevailing argument for the ’Waegu appeasement policy of the Joseon Government’ (the “Prevailing Argument”). The Prevailing Argument has viewed that the surrendered Waegu fled due to their doubt having arisen from the inappropriate reception by Ryu Yang (柳亮), mayor of Gyerim (鷄林府), and that the punishment of military officers by the Joseon government was to blame for their negligence in managing the surrendered Waegu. Therefore, such actions by the Joseon government have been deemed as part of the ’Waegu appeasement policy’. However, the Prevailing Argument has several problems in interpreting the relevant historical records. In this regard, in relation to the second escape incident of the surrendered Waegu in April 1397, this paper confirmed the existence of Park Ja-an (朴子安)’s attack attempt against the surrendered Waegu. Also, as the Park’s attack attempt at that time was treated as highly confidential by the Joseon government, this paper viewed that the Joseon government ordered Park for the attack. With respect to the first escape incident of the surrendered Waegu in late December 1396, this paper made it clear that the Joseon government ordered four local commanders, including Choi Unhae (崔雲海), for the preparation for an attack against the surrendered Waegu, but that the commanders failed to fulfill the tasks within the ordered schedule, resulting in the above-mentioned punishment by the Joseon government. Also, this paper viewed that Ryu Yang sent a monk named Ui-un (義雲) to persuade the surrendered Waegu, but that Ui-un’s careless leakage of information on the attack plan by the Joseon government resulted in the escape of the surrendered Waegu. This paper also newly confirmed that the pattern which can be seen in a series of the above-mentioned incidents in the early Joseon period is almost the same as that of the escape incident by Fuji Tsunemitsu (藤經光) Waegu group in 1375 in the late Koryo period. In fact, Nakaon Waegu group surrendered because of the Joseon government’s formation of the conquering army to Iki Island and Tsushima. Therefore, the surrender was a temporary expedient in order to evade the threat from the Joseon’s conquering army. The surrender was made only within the most limited scope, and the surrendered Waegu continued retaining their original troops and warships almost as before. The Joseon government was vigilant against them, which led the attack attempts. Considering these aspects, the Joseon government’s attack attempts against the surrendered Waegu cannot be deemed as a ’Waegu appeasement policy’. The Prevailing Argument focusing on the ’Waegu appeasement policy’ cannot explain a series of the historical facts confirmed as above. The Prevailing Argument, as well as the studies which have been made regarding the naturalized Japanese in early Joseon period based on it, should be re-reviewed in this respect.