기업집단의 피라미드 소유구조 계층이 기업의 투자-현금흐름민감도에 미치는 영향
Pyramidal Ownership Structure and the Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flows
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본 연구는 투자-현금흐름 모형을 이용하여 지배주주의 대리인문제라는 시장불완전요인이 기업의 현금흐름과 투자 간의 관계에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 전형적인 피라미드 소유구조를 보이는 국내기업집단에서 지배주주는 자신의 지분을 피라미드 상위계층에 있는 기업에 집중시키는 한편, 피라미드 하위에 위치한 기업에 대해서는 계열사들이 지분을 매입하도록 해서 지배권을 유지한다. 이럴 경우, 지배주주 입장에서는 위험 대비 수익성이 높은 투자기회를 피라미드 상위 기업에 먼저 배정하고 상대적으로 효율성이 낮은 투자기회를 피라미드 하위 기업에 배정할 유인을 가지게 된다. 나아가 음(-)의 순현재가치(NPV)가 기대되지만 지배주주의 사적이익을 제고하는 투자기회가 존재할 때, 피라미드 하위 기업의 자본을 활용하려는 유인을 가질 수도 있다.
Abstract
We examine the effect of a firm’s status in a pyramidal ownership structure of Korean business group on the relation between the firm’s investment and its cash flows. Controlling shareholders in a business group concentrate their cash ownership on the firms ranked at the top layer of the pyramid. Firms in the low pyramidal ranks are mostly owned by other member firms of the business group and still under the influence of the controlling shareholder. It gives controlling shareholders an incentive to allocate relatively less efficient investment opportunities to the firms ranked lower in the pyramid. Moreover, controlling shareholders might have an incentive to utilize the resources of a firm in the low layer of the pyramid for an opportunity to enhance their own private benefit. By measuring a firm’s rank in the ownership pyramid using the discrepancy between cash flow right and voting right of controlling shareholders, we find that the sensitivity of a firm’s capital expenditure to its cash flows from operation increases as the firm’s rank on the ownership pyramid declines. The results suggest that financial restriction is more binding in the firms of low ranks of the ownership pyramid because investors are more concerned about the wealth transfer as the firm is ranked lower in the pyramid.
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