Trade Policy Formation through Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining
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This paper examines the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on the trade policy formation in which three legislators bargainin the small open economy which has a fixed factor of production. We derive the equilibrium contributions and the equilibrium trade policy proposals in a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that equilibrium contributions to a trade policy in both systems equal zero. Second, unlike the previous models in the literature, this model illustrates that the interest group associated with nonmember in the parliamentary system can be better off.
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on the trade policy formation in which three legislators bargainin the small open economy which has a fixed factor of production. We derive the equilibrium contributions and the equilibrium trade policy proposals in a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that equilibrium contributions to a trade policy in both systems equal zero. Second, unlike the previous models in the literature, this model illustrates that the interest group associated with nonmember in the parliamentary system can be better off.
참고문헌 (19)
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