Voting Over Trade Policy
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This paper analyzes the voting equilibrium in the small open economy which has a fixed factor of production. Since the preferences of voters satisfy the single-crossing property, the policy preferred by the median-voter is the unique equilibrium under pure majority rule in the simple electoral competition. When we introduce the different ideologies by the candidates, the trade policy level in the voting equilibrium is greater or lower than the normative utilitarian benchmark according to the different groups’ relative densities.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the voting equilibrium in the small open economy which has a fixed factor of production. Since the preferences of voters satisfy the single-crossing property, the policy preferred by the median-voter is the unique equilibrium under pure majority rule in the simple electoral competition. When we introduce the different ideologies by the candidates, the trade policy level in the voting equilibrium is greater or lower than the normative utilitarian benchmark according to the different groups’ relative densities.
참고문헌 (22)
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