LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING OVER TRADE POLICY
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초록
This paper analyzes trade policy formation in which three politicians with different preferences bargain over trade policy in a small open economy which has a fixed factor of production. I examine three cases which depend on the share of the factor of production and exogenous parameters in closedrule one-round bargaining. Unlike the previous models in the public choice literature, this model illustrates that the preferences of the centrist party may not be strategically important. As a result, this party may not be a part of the coalition and it is possible that the extreme parties form a coalition.
Abstract
This paper analyzes trade policy formation in which three politicians with different preferences bargain over trade policy in a small open economy which has a fixed factor of production. I examine three cases which depend on the share of the factor of production and exogenous parameters in closedrule one-round bargaining. Unlike the previous models in the public choice literature, this model illustrates that the preferences of the centrist party may not be strategically important. As a result, this party may not be a part of the coalition and it is possible that the extreme parties form a coalition.
참고문헌 (12)
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