Optimal Export Subsidies under Asymmetric Information about Cost Structure
1
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
It is common that governments do not know the cost structure of firms when they select trade policies. Therefore, the government can choose a policy that can make firms reveal their true cost or a policy under which firms do not reveal their true cost. To induce firms to reveal their true cost, the policy maker chooses a policy menu consisting of policies for high cost firms and low cost firms. However, to make firms not reveal their true cost, the policy maker can use a uniform policy which is independent of the cost structure. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to show under which circumstances it is beneficial for the domestic country to make the domestic firm reveal its cost structure. By using backward induction, we find that the domestic government wants to hide the cost structure of the domestic firm by imposing a uniform policy.
Abstract
It is common that governments do not know the cost structure of firms when they select trade policies. Therefore, the government can choose a policy that can make firms reveal their true cost or a policy under which firms do not reveal their true cost. To induce firms to reveal their true cost, the policy maker chooses a policy menu consisting of policies for high cost firms and low cost firms. However, to make firms not reveal their true cost, the policy maker can use a uniform policy which is independent of the cost structure. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to show under which circumstances it is beneficial for the domestic country to make the domestic firm reveal its cost structure. By using backward induction, we find that the domestic government wants to hide the cost structure of the domestic firm by imposing a uniform policy.
참고문헌 (10)
- Brainard, S.L, "Strategic trade policy design with symmetric information and public contract", Review of Economic Studies, 63, pp.81~105 (1996)
- Brander, J.A, "Strategic trade policy", Handbook of International Economics, 3, pp.1395~1455 (1995)
- Brander, J.A, "Export subsidies and export share rivalry", Journal of International Economics, 18, pp.83~100 (1985)
- Creane, A, "Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy", Journal of International Economics, 75, pp.221~244 (2008)
- Eaton, J, "Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, pp.383~406 (1986)
- Maggi, G, "A note on strategic trade policy design with asymmetric information and public contracts", Review of Economic Studies, 65, pp.623~625 (1998)
- Maggi, G, "Strategic trade policy under incomplete information", International Economic Review, 40, pp.571~594 (1999)
- Okajima, Y, "A note on optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information", Journal of International Economics, 61, pp.243~246 (2003)
- Qiu, L.D, "Optimal strategic trade policy under asymmetric information", Journal of International Economics, 36, pp.333~354 (1994)
- Qiu, L.D, "Reply", Journal of International Economics, 61, pp.247~248 (2003)