국제관계에서의 경제적 상호의존관계와 최적 자원배분 균형분석
Economic Interdependence and the Optimal Resource Allocation
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이 논문은 무역과 경합(contest)이론을 통합한 이국(二國)모형에서 경제적 상호의존관계가최적 자원배분 균형에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 논문의 주요 결과는 다음과 같다: (1) 양국의 경제재가 서로 대체관계에 있을 때, 군사부문 및 경제부문 간의 자원배분은 양국의 부존자원이나 군사재 및 경제재 생산기술의 변화에 영향을 받는다. 양국간 생산기술의 비교우위가 존재하는 것은 안정된 균형의 존재를 위한 필수요소의 하나이다. 어떠한 생산기술의 비교우위도 존재하지 않는 경우, 각국은 자원의 크기에 무관하게 같은 크기의 군사예산을 사용하는 안정된 유일한 균형을 택한다. 반면 생산기술의 비교우위가 존재하는 경우, 적어도 하나의 불안정한 균형을 포함하여 복수의 균형이 존재할 수 있다. (2) 양국의 경제재가 서로 보완관계에 있는 경우, 일국의 자원배분을 결정하는 주요 요소는 보유자원을 사용하여 생산가능한 군사재의 크기이다. 이 경우, 안정된 유일한 균형이 존재한다. (3) 양국이 같은 크기의 자원과 생산기술을 보유하고 있는 경우, 경제재가 대체재인 경우와 보완재인 경우의 최적 자원배분은 동일하며, 안정적이고 유일한 균형이다.
Abstract
This paper analyzes links between economic interdependence and the existence and stability of optimal resource allocations under anarchy by integrating a contest model and a trade model. The main findings are as follows: (1) When economic goods of two states are substitutable, any changes in endowments or technologies from both states affect the resource allocation between the military sector and the economic sector. Moreover, the existence of comparative advantage of production technologies is an essential factor of equilibrium stability. Without any comparative advantage in production technologies, each state has a unique stable equilibrium at which both states build the same military level regardless of their size. With a comparative, there may exist multiple equilibria containing at least one unstable equilibrium. (2) When economic goods from two states are complementary with Cobb-Douglas utility characteristics, the essential factor that affects a state‘s resource allocation is its own maximum military level of production out of its resource endowment. In this case, there exists a unique stable equilibrium. (3) When both states have the same resource endowments and production technologies, the optimal allocations in the case of substitutes are the same as those in the case of complementsand they are unique and stable. presence of economic interdependence between states that in the absence of it.
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