Asymmetries in Conflict and Resource Allocation
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
두 경제주체가 공공의 산출물을 생산하고 재산권이 설정되어 있지 않은 상황에서 그들의 몫을 결정하는 경제에서, 본 논문은 두 경제주체 간에 존재하는 자원, 생산과 약탈행위의 효율성에 있어서 비대칭성이 어떻게 경제의 자원배분과 소득배분에 영향을 주는지 분석하고 있다. 예를 들어 두 경제주체의 생산행위의 효율성에 차이가 있는 경우, 두 경제주체의 시초자원의 차이가 더 커질수록 혹은 두 경제주체의 약탈행위의 효율성의 차이가 벌어질수록 경제의 총 약탈적 행위는 증가하는데 이는 생산성이 높은 경제주체가 더 부자이고 혹은 약탈적 행위의 효율성이 더 클 경우에만 가능하다. 본 논문은 약탈행위에 비교우위가 있는 경제주체가 상대적으로 더 많은 몫을 차지한다는 것을 보이고 또 어떤 조건에서 경제의 자원이 최소한으로 약탈적 행위에 배분될 수 있는 지를 살펴보고 있다.
Abstract
Investigating a conflict in an economy of two agents that jointly produce a common pool of output and determine their share in the absence of property rights, this paper analyses how three asymmetries, disparity in resource endowment and differential efficiencies in production and appropriation, interact to affect the allocation of resources and the division of joint output between them. For example, given differential efficiency in production, an increase in resource disparity or widening gap in relative appropriative efficiency would increase total appropriative activities only if productively more efficient agent becomes relatively richer or becomes relatively more skillful in appropriation. This paper shows that the agent who has a comparative advantage in appropriation takes a larger share of joint output. It is also shown that in an economy where richer agent's relative appropriative efficiency is at the maximum level while his relative productive efficiency is at the minimum level and poorer agent is just about to cease production, a least amount of resources is wasted on appropriative activities.
참고문헌 (19)
- "Inequality and Growth" (1996)
- "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations", 105, pp.1~29 (1997)
- "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters", 44 (2000)
- "Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics", 44(1), pp.5~16 (2000)
- "Swords or plowshares?: A theory of the security of claims to property", 103, pp.1275~1288 (1995)
- "Predation and production, In: Garfinkel, M. R., Skaperdas, S. (Eds.) The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation", pp.57~71 (1996), Cambridge University Press
- "The analytics of continuing conflict", pp.201~233 (1988)
- "The paradox of power", eco(mics and politics), pp.177~200 (1991)
- "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity", pp.130~134 (1991)
- "Anarchy and its breakdown", 103, pp.26~52 (1995)
- "Evolution and the Theory of Games" (1982), Cambridge University Press
- "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict", 35(3), pp.480~494 (1996)
- "A general equilibrium model of two group conflict with endogenous intra-group sharing rules", 98, pp.251~267 (1999)
- "Two and one sided conflict: Effectiveness and scale in a ratio form of conflict technology", 13, pp.101~118 (1999)
- "Production, Appropriation, and Income Transfer", pp.279~287 (2002)
- "and power in the absence of property rights", pp.720~739 (1992)
- "Contest success functions", 7, pp.283~290 (1996)
- "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities", 64, pp.101~117 (1997)
- "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities", 64, pp.101~117 (1997)