자유무역협정과 원산지규정의 후생분석
The Welfare Analysis of Rules of Origin in a Free Trade Area
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본 연구는 불완전경쟁의 수출경합모델(export rivalry model)을 이용, 원산지규정의 강화가 FTA 역내국 및 역외 최종재 수출국의 후생에 미치는 효과를 분석한다. 최종재 수입국에 의한 원산지규정의 강화는 역내 라이벌 최종재기업의 중간재 조달비용을 높임으로써(raising rival's cost) 최종재 부문에서 역내기업으로의 렌트이전 및 역외기업으로의 렌트유출 효과를 가진다. 이에 원산지규정 강화는 이에 직면하는 역내 최종재 수출국의 후생을 반드시 감소시킨다. 한편 역외국에 대해 최적관세가 선택되는 경우, 역내 최종재 수입국에 의한 원산지규정의 후생효과는 오로지 역내 기업간 시장점유율 차이에만 의존한다. 이때 역내 원산지규정 부과국에 입지하는 최종재 기업의 시장점유율이 역내 상대국 라이벌 최종재기업의 시장점유율 보다 적다면 원산지규정의 강화는 역내 모든 국가에게 경제적 손실을 가중시키고 반면에 역외국에게 경제적 이득을 가져다준다. 이와 같은 관점에서 FTA에서 원산지규정의 설계는 매우 중요하다.
Abstract
With a three country partial equilibrium export rivalry model, this paper explores the welfare effects of Rule of Origin(ROO) both for member countries and a non-member country when an FTA is in place. Since the tightening of ROO of final-good importing country deteriorates the cost structure of the other member country's final-good producer (raising rival's cost), it causes rents shift effect within the member countries and parts of rents are also spilled over into the non-member country. Thus ROO can benefit the FTA outside country and hurt inside member countries. Meanwhile, in the case where optimal tariffs are levied onto final-good imports from the outside country, the welfare effects of the ROO on final-good importing country depend only on the market share difference between final-good producers within member countries. By tightening the ROO in the final-good importing country, the welfare of all member countries might be decreased while that of non-member country increased if the final-good market share of ROO imposing country is smaller than that of the other member country.
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