壬辰倭亂 직전 戰爭情報와 조선의 對應

Abstract

This study aims to 1) examine warfare information of Joseon just before the Imjin War in diplomatic relation between Ming and Japan as an important factor of a complete defeat of the initial stage of the war, 2) to investigate the war preparation process of Joseon shown in the collection of information and decision making of utilizing collected information in an official diplomatic relation, and finally 3) to verify the cause of disastrous defeat in the initial stage was incompetence of collecting information and utilizing it which led to confusion and misjudgement of crisis awareness of Joseon. Both Joseon and Japan could collect accurate information through their official diplomats of Tongsinsa(通信使) of Joseon and Gukwangsa(國王使) of Japan respectively. However, before the occurrence of the war, Joseon came across its limitation in collecting information against Japan, because there was 150 years information gap between 1443 and 1590 where no Tongsinsa reached to Japan's capital city. In particular, limited information from Waegwan and Tsushima, the only available source during the gap period tended to be distorted for a political and economical purpose or interest which caused a confusion of crisis awareness of the royal court of Joseon despite the direct threat of Japan. Meanwhile, Joseon that belonged to an international of East Asia had encountered a situation to report collected Information to Ming as to Tongsinsa of 1590 and the direct threat of Japan. However, even before the report reached to Ming, a Fujian merchant Heo Euihoo (許儀後) sent a letter to inland China and spread out throughout China as a fixed fact. In order to resolve such an external transition, the royal court of Joseon had to actively reply the request of explanation from Ming. Nonetheless, Joseon lost trust with Ming which became a crucial element that Ming did not dispatch troops in the initial stage of the war. Toyotomi Hideyoshi who unified Japan from the age of rival warlords began from the revolt of Eungin(應仁) of 1467, gave an order the 'invasion of Joseon' to the warlord of Tsushima. He distorted Toyotomi Hideyoshi's information of conquering Joseon and requested the dispatch of Tongsinsa to Joseon. The royal court of Joseon with no clear understanding of Japanese political environment sent Tongsinsa to Japan in 1590 to see the environment of Japan and to check the reliability of breaking out a war in a response to the request of Gado-Ibmyeong (假道入明) or Jeongmyeong-hyangdo(征明嚮導). But, the members of Tongsinsa made contradictory reports to each other and in fear of agitation of people, the royal court misjudged that there would be no war. It clearly demonstrated the limits of collecting and utilizing information on Japan. The confusion of crisis awareness began from the information gap of 150 years during which neither information was properly collected nor utilizing information was properly carried out. After those period, Tongsinsa gave contradictory interpretations which worsened the confusion. Although there was an imminent threat of a war, Joseon could not prepare the war appropriately which brought out a disastrous defeat in the initial stage of the Imjin war.