피의자 진술증거에 관한 입법방향 연구

Abstract

The suspect's statement in the investigative stage is subject to risks in terms of voluntariness, authenticity, and reliability, but they have a higher probative value than the defendant’s trial statement. The reason to regulate using suspect statements in trial evidence is not because they are inherently inferior in terms of evidentiary value, but to enhance the voluntariness and authenticity of suspect statements. In our traditional discourse surrounding the use of suspect statements in trial evidence, the evidentiary value of suspect statements has been disparaged, but this is not based on a scientific or rational basis. The way in which suspect statements in the investigative stage are regulated depends firstly on the tradition of the criminal justice system, which is largely categoricalized of two different traditions which are the inquisitorialism and the adversarialism, and secondly on Damaška's typology of the function and structure of criminal justice system. However, it is difficult to find any criminal justice system that wholly denies the use of suspect statements as evidence per se. According to Damaška's typology, the Korean criminal justice system obviously belongs to the tradition of inquisitorial criminal justice which is characterized by state-led judicial functions and hierarchical judicial structure, rather than a party-oriented criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the Korean CriminalProcedureAct and Supreme Courtprecedents that deny the evidentiary value of suspect statements and overly strictly recognize their admissibility are systematically contradictory to its tradition and they are theoretically and policy-wise very difficult to explain. The Supreme Court does not precisely cite nor fundamentally redefine the concepts of hearsay rule and directness pr inciple(unmittelbarkeitsprinzip), but merely declares them impressionistically to regulate the admissibility of out-of-court evidence. Rather than viewing the protocol of suspect interogation as a means of establishing the voluntariness and authenticity of out of court statements, the Supreme Court's position appears to treat it as if it exists for its own sake. This inverted evidentiary approach also creates a number of practical problems in defining and applying the concept of special circumstance of credibility and etc. It is difficult to understand the policy rationale for the special treatment of investigator testimony, which is now the only means of introducing the suspect's statement into trial evidence under the revised Code of Criminal Procedure, as it can not be considered to have superior evidencial value in terms of memory accuracy or bias of investigators. The concepts and requirements of our hearsay rule are completely different from those of Anglo-American evidence law, and the concepts of reliability, voluntariness and authenticity are mixed and mingled, making their true nature extremely opaque. The current opaque and irrational state of our evidence rules on protocols of suspect interogation in the Criminal Procedure Code is due to the fact that the principles of oralism and directness have been attempted to be achieved not through the real reform and supplementation of the trial procedure with increased expense and resource of the judiciary, but only by the superficial amendment of the evidence law in an inadequate and inappropriate manner. Based on the above comparative legal review and criticism, the following three principles should guide the legislative direction of suspect statement evidence. First, the need for investigative evidence of suspect statements should be balanced against the risks. Second, the criminal justice system should be consistent, rational, and transparent. Third, the principle of oralism in criminal trials must be upheld, and legislative responses to the rising costs of justice must be addressed. In addition, the key to future reform, in my view, is to normalize the law of evidence, which has been so heavily focused on protocols that it has become a distortion, and to build the evidence law that is consistent with the overriding principles of directness and oralism, but also consistent with the consistency of our inquisitorial criminal justice system. The inquisitorial criminal justice system aims to collect highly evidentiary hearsay evidence at an early stage through judicial investigative procedures that ensure objectivity and neutrality in order to discover the truth of the matter, file a prosecution only when the charges are sufficiently substantiated, and use the out of court evidence including suspect statements contained in protocols at the trial. The suspect statement recorded in these investigative procedures should be admissible as evidence. However, the interrogation process must be strictly regulated to ensure the voluntariness and authenticity of the suspect's statements. The best tool to achieve this goal is to require video recording of the interrogation, and the resulting video recordings should be admissible as evidence if the accused changes his or her story in court. The problems of so-called protocol-based trial are not solved by changing the evidence law alone. The root reason why Korean hearsay rules are filled with irrational and opaque rules is that the problem of hearsay rule has been approached only from the perspective of investigative control, not from the perspective of evidence law, which should have focused on the discovery of the truth. In a state where the efficiency of trials is strained by the accumulation of long-term backlogs, where intensive hearings cannot be conducted properly, and where courts are given wide discretion as to how to conduct trials, the principles of oralism and directness, even if they limit the use of protocols, can always be eroded. The most effective way to ensure that the practice of protocal-based trial practice is eradicated is to introduce a German or Japanese-style of civil judge(Laienrichter) system. The efficiency and sustainability of the criminal justice system must be taken into consideration when attempting to make this transition to normalize evidence law and practices. Fully implementing the prioritization of the principles of oralism, directness, and the complete abolition of protocol-based trial will require significant judicial costs, time, and effort. The successful implementation of a reformed evidentiary system will necessarily involve creative thinking and reform of summary judgment procedures and summary public proceedings.