회사지배구조와 신인(충실)의무 구체화 문제에 대한 비교법경제학적 고찰
Corporate Governance and the Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach
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초록
회사 자산과 현금흐름으로 사익추구를 할 수 있는 의사결정권자들이 다양하고, 이들의 사익추구 방지라는 소극적 충실의무와 회사의 장기적 가치 증진이라는 적극적 충실의무가 얽혀있기 때문에, 회사와 관련한 신인·충실의무 구체화 문제는 대단히 복잡하다. 미국에서는 대리비용 모델이 주류를 형성하며 입법에도 지대한 영향을 끼쳐왔다. 그러나 법경제학 방법론은 만능도구가 아니며 잘못된 가설을 세우거나 데이터를 잘못 선택하면 잘못된 결론에 도달할 수밖에 없다. 경영자/이사회의 충실의무 범위와 내용에 대해 여러 견해가 있으나, 회사의 장기적 가치 실현이 적극적 충실의무라는 점에는 이견이 없다. 헤지펀드 등 대형 기관투자자의 경영개입이 회사 가치를 저해한다고 최고경영자와 이사회가 판단한 경우에는 방어할 수 있어야 한다. 소수주주도 지배주주와 마찬가지로 사익추구를 할 수 있다. 따라서 소수주주 권한 강화가 회사 성과에 긍정적이라는 보장은 없고, 오히려 혼란만 가중시킬 수 있다. 이사회의 독립성이나 직원의 경영개입의 경우도 마찬가지의 문제가 있다. 회사의 장기적 가치 증진에 가장 큰 결정적인 요인은 시장경쟁력이므로, 충실의무의 적극적 실현 문제는 대외적 경쟁력을 고려하여 논의해야 하고 지배구조 만능론에서 벗어날 필요가 있다. 한국은 독특하게 기업집단 지배구조와 계열사/특수관계인 거래를 독점규제법으로 규율하고 있으나 충실의무 문제로 규율하는 것이 전체 법질서의 정합성에 합치되고 규제 오류도 방지할 수 있다. 한편 표면상 공익을 강조하는 ESG 투자가 세계적 유행이나, 이로 인해 자본시장에 버블이 형성되고 있을 수 있으므로 주의가 필요하다.
Abstract
This article addressed the problems of fiduciary principle and corporate governance in Korea from a perspective of comparative law and economics as well as politics. Most jurisdictions have adopted the agency model in dealing with corporate governance and the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Many provisions of Korean corporate law and other regulations reflect the agency model which supports the active role of minority shareholders. However, it should be noted that active shareholders are usually hedge funds seeking short-term profits, and they may harm corporate’s long-term value. There is no clear evidence that either so-called ‘Environmental, Social and Governance’ engagement or employee participation may really promote corporate’s long-term value. In Korea, there are a myriad of cases showing that trade unions have pursued rent seeking at the cost of firms, not always but sometimes in illegal ways. Of course, the purposes of corporate can be various, and every corporate must follow law and regulations which already reflect public interests, such as competition law, consumer protection law, environmental law. We need to recognize that there is no such thing as one-size-fits-all corporate governance in the real world.
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