中国国有企业高管薪酬法律规制：经验，实证与路径选择

Abstract

The source of the struggling legal regulation of the executives’ pay in state-owned enterprises is that the executives of most state-owned enterprises are not selected from the market but from administrative appointments, which gave the government department in charge sufficient legal premise to regulate their pay as external forces. However, the strict broad-brush administrative regulations and policies intensified the irrelevance between executive pay and business performance. It is necessary to classify the way and extent to legally regulate the executive payment in state-owned enterprises according to different types of the nature and function of them. It is also necessary to correct the strict control of the executive pay policy to the competitive state-owned enterprises. Achieving the marketing selection of the executives, we have to improve the market-based mechanisms of pay contractual arrangements and implementation between the enterprise and executives. Then ultimately achieve a high relevancy between the executive pay and performance of management. The role of the law is to guide, ensure and enhance this correlation.