公司治理对高管薪酬与企业绩效关联度的影响研究 ——以中国上市公司为对象
The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Relevance between Executive Compensation and Performance -Evidence from Listed Firms in China-
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초록
近年来，中国上市公司的高管薪酬增长迅速，并引起了社会的广泛关注。在企业的经营管理活动中，高层管理人员是主要的决策者和管理者，企业绩效的好坏、发展前景和股东的利益实现，在很大程度上与高管人员的行为相关，因此，解决股东与高管之间的代理问题尤为重要。高管薪酬机制是解决股东和高管人员的代理问题的一种主要的方法，它通过激励高管人员，减少高管人员的道德风险和逆向选择，降低代理成本，增加股东的利益。但是，近年来不少研究发现高管在其薪酬制定中存在明显的自利行为，且这种自利行为降低或者消除了薪酬的激励作用。本文分析了中国上市公司治理结构对高管薪酬与企业绩效关联度的影响，验证了公司治理对高管薪酬机制的调节效应。分析结果表明，第一，高管薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关；第二，股权集中度、董事会规模、董事会持股比例对高管薪酬与企业绩效关联度产生正向的调节作用，使薪酬和绩效的关联关系增强；两职合一和独立董事比例对高管薪酬与企业绩效关联度产生反向的调节作用，使薪酬和绩效的关联关系减弱。第三，民营企业的董事会规模、董事会持股比例对高管薪酬与企业绩效关联度呈显著的正相关，说明对薪酬机制存在积极的调节作用，而国有企业的董事会结构特征未能对制定有效的薪酬激励机制产生积极的作用。本研究的结果有助于完善公司治理和高管薪酬机制，对降低代理成本，保护股东利益具有重要意义。
Abstract
Executive compensation of the listed companies in China has been increasing dramatically in recent years. As the decision maker and manager of company’s operation, the executives’ behavior has critical impacts on the company’s performance, as well as the company’s prospects and the shareholders' benefits. Therefore, resolving the agency problem between shareholders and managers is very important. Compensation mechanism is one of the main means to resolve the agency problem. Good compensation mechanism can encourage executives, and lower the agency costs, furthermore to improve shareholders' benefit. But many researchers have found that there are managerial entrenchments in determining executive compensation, and such managerial entrenchments will reduce compensation’s incentive effects. This essay analyzes the impact of corporate governance on the relevance between executive compensation and performance, examines the moderating effect of corporate governance on executives' compensation mechanism in China. The results are as follows: Firstly, executives’ compensation is significantly positively related with ROA. Secondly, ownership concentration, board size, shareholdings rate of the board have positive effect to the relevance between compensation and performance, and thus strengthen the compensation and performance relevance. Duality, independent director proportion have negative effect to the relevance between compensation and performance, and thus weaken the compensation and performance relevance. Thirdly, board size, shareholdings rate of the board is positively related to the compensation and performance relevance in private companies, it means corporate governance has positive effect on compensation mechanism, but in subsample of state-owned companies, we haven't found that positive effect. The results of this paper will contribute to perfect the executive compensation mechanism, and have important significance for lowering agency cost, and improving shareholders’ benefit.
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