포이즌필의 본질과 회사지배구조
The Natural of the poison pill and Corporate Governance
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최근 미국과 일본에서의 포이즌필 논쟁의 쟁점은 회사법상 인정되고 있는 이사회의 포이즌필 사용권한에 주주들이 얼마나 관여하며 통제할 수 있을 것인가이고 이것은 주주(총회)와 이사(회)간의 권한분배라는 현대 회사지배구조 논쟁의 큰 틀 속에서 논의되고 있다. 우리나라에서도 포이즌 필로 활용될 수 있는 ‘신주인수선택권’ 도입을 위한 상법 개정안(회사편)이 마련돼 국회통과를 기다리고 있다. 그러나 우리나라의 상법개정안에서는 주주총회 특별결의라는 엄격한 사전적 요건을 충족시켜야만 한다. 포이즌필의 본질과 회사지배구조의 관점에서 비판적으로 검토하고 있다. 신주인수선택권은 본래 자본시장에서 다양한 기능을 수행하는 제도이고 이러한 목적을 위해 이사회가 발행할 수 있는 것이 원칙이다. 다만 이러한 목적 외에 경영권방어를 위한 포이즌필로 사용했을 경우의 정당성 범위는 행정지침과 사법부의 판단을 통해 설정되도록 하는 것이 바람직 하다.
Abstract
In current financial crisis, boards are likely to receive increased pressure from activist shareholders to take actions that increase short-term shareholder value but may impair a company’s ability to execute its long-term business strategy. Boards of Directors wish to consider adopting “poison pills” to protect shareholders from coercive takeovers or other actions that a Board believes are not in the best interests of all shareholders. The number of poison pill adopted by companies increased. The term “poison pill” does not refer to a single, uniform device. Rather, it refers to a family of devices that operate in a similar fashion. The poison pill defense is generally implemented through the adoption, by a company's board of directors, of a “warrants”. Warrants would, in the event of a hostile takeover, provide every shareholder--other than the acquiror--the right to acquire additional securities at a significant discount (or even free). This discriminatory discount would dilute the interest of the acquiror, making acquisition of the company prohibitively expensive. The issuance of warrants also may be used as a “sweetener” or “nuisance fee” paid to gain the support of various classes of security holders and, therefore, prevent certain hurdles from arising that could unnecessarily lengthen and complicate the reorganization process. The most important inquiry that remains to be solved is to what extent a target board can act to prevent hostile takeover attempts without asking shareholder' approval.
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