예(禮)의 개정 가능성에 관한 이론적 토대 모색

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to seek a theoretical basis for the revision of li 禮 as a moral principle, which is a moral principle that arises through the habits of society for a long time. The moral principle means fixed values such as ren 仁, which is used through the times, while the form of li is constantly changing with the times. What is the mediating between the inner values of li and the changing forms? This is a question of what the theoretical foundation is for reinterpreting the appropriate manners of the times. In other words, before discussing the timeliness of li, we seek the theoretical basis for making it possible: the timeliness of li will be secured through the implicit consent of those who live in contemporaries. I have focused on this and have looked at the discussion of rujia 儒家 (in the case of xin 心 and li). Mengzi 孟子 who first mentioned the subjective status of the mind in the Confucian philosophy and Xunzi 荀子 who is considered to be in the opposite direction with Mengzi. They all seem to open up the possibility of revising through the reflective function of xin for li, but there is a theoretical limit to discussing the revision of li only when they become a shengren 聖人 in the end. On the other hand, yangzi 良知 of Wang yangming 王陽明 has self-sufficiency which means that theoretically the li can be revised without need of transition of existence.