China’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy under Xi Jinping: From Minimum Deterrence to Strategic Ambiguity-Based Limited Deterrence
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This study reassesses China’s nuclear strategy under Xi Jinping and argues that Beijing is moving beyond traditional minimum deterrence toward what can be characterized as a Strategic Ambiguity-Based Limited Deterrence posture. To evaluate this shift, the paper develops a three-criteria framework—changes in declaratory policy, modernization of operational and structural capabilities, and ambiguity in nuclear-use thresholds—and applies it to Chinese sources and secondary literature. Extending Sagan’s security, domestic politics, and norms models, the study proposes an adaptable analytical framework that explains how post–acquisition doctrinal change is shaped by evolving threat perceptions, political centralization, and prestige-oriented identity construction. Empirically, the analysis identifies expanding triad capabilities, diversified delivery systems, and layered nuclear signaling that preserves NFU while increasing conditionality. These findings suggest that China is increasingly using ambiguity as a deliberate instrument to enhance deterrent flexibility and crisis bargaining leverage. Regionally, this shift heightens risks of misperception, crisis instability, and divergent threat assessments among U.S. allies. The paper contributes a conceptual model for assessing China’s evolving doctrine and for comparing how ambiguity functions across emerging nuclear postures in Northeast Asia.
Abstract
This study reassesses China’s nuclear strategy under Xi Jinping and argues that Beijing is moving beyond traditional minimum deterrence toward what can be characterized as a Strategic Ambiguity-Based Limited Deterrence posture. To evaluate this shift, the paper develops a three-criteria framework—changes in declaratory policy, modernization of operational and structural capabilities, and ambiguity in nuclear-use thresholds—and applies it to Chinese sources and secondary literature. Extending Sagan’s security, domestic politics, and norms models, the study proposes an adaptable analytical framework that explains how post–acquisition doctrinal change is shaped by evolving threat perceptions, political centralization, and prestige-oriented identity construction. Empirically, the analysis identifies expanding triad capabilities, diversified delivery systems, and layered nuclear signaling that preserves NFU while increasing conditionality. These findings suggest that China is increasingly using ambiguity as a deliberate instrument to enhance deterrent flexibility and crisis bargaining leverage. Regionally, this shift heightens risks of misperception, crisis instability, and divergent threat assessments among U.S. allies. The paper contributes a conceptual model for assessing China’s evolving doctrine and for comparing how ambiguity functions across emerging nuclear postures in Northeast Asia.