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North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy under the Pretext of Minimum Deterrence: Implications for the Korean Peninsula

Zafar Khan
통일연구원 (YONSEI INSTITUTE FOR NORTH KOREAN STUDIES)|2015.12|International Journal of Korean Unification Studies|제24권 제3호|pp. 181-216|DOI 10.33728/ijkus.2015.24.3.007

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North KoreaKorean Peninsulanuclear strategyessentials of minimum deterrenceROK-U.S.

초록

Little is known about North Korea’s nuclear strategy. It is shrouded with greater ambiguity, which plays a central role in its nuclear weapons program. In the absence of North Korea’s policy document and institutionalization of its nuclear policy, it is not clear what nuclear strategy North Korea would opt for and why. Therefore, one expects many speculative interpretations on the evolving nuclear strategy of North Korea. This article attempts to predict under the conceptual essentials of minimum deterrence that North Korea would follow minimum deterrence. But under the pretext of minimum deterrence, it would have multiple options to opt for one or more types of nuclear strategies. However, each of these nuclear strategies would have strategic implications for North Korea in general and the Korean Peninsula in particular.

Abstract

Little is known about North Korea’s nuclear strategy. It is shrouded with greater ambiguity, which plays a central role in its nuclear weapons program. In the absence of North Korea’s policy document and institutionalization of its nuclear policy, it is not clear what nuclear strategy North Korea would opt for and why. Therefore, one expects many speculative interpretations on the evolving nuclear strategy of North Korea. This article attempts to predict under the conceptual essentials of minimum deterrence that North Korea would follow minimum deterrence. But under the pretext of minimum deterrence, it would have multiple options to opt for one or more types of nuclear strategies. However, each of these nuclear strategies would have strategic implications for North Korea in general and the Korean Peninsula in particular.

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