미국과 북한의 양자게임을 통한 한국의 북핵 억제정책 평가
An Assessment of South Korea’s Deterrence Policy Against North Korea’s Nuclear Threats through a bilateral game model between U.S. and North Korea
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초록
본 연구는 현 정부의 북핵 억제정책의 실효성를 확인하기 위하여, 게임이론을 바탕으로 확장억제의 실행 주체인 미국과 도발의 주체인 북한 사이의 양자게임을 구성하여 억제의 실행자 관점에서 발동조건을 확인하고, 현 정부의 정책들이 미국의 억제발동 조건의 강화에 어떻게 기여하는지 확인하였다. 최종적으로 본 연구는 현 정부가 워싱턴 선언, NCG 설치 등 다양한 외교적 노력을 통하여 미국의 평판비용을 증가시키고, 재래식 전력을 강화하여 완전한 승리 가능성을 증가시킴으로써 미국의 확장억제 발동 가능성을 향상시켰다고 평가하였다.
Abstract
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the current government's North Korean nuclear deterrence policy, this research establishes a bilateral game model between the United States, the actor of extended deterrence, and North Korea, the actor of provocation, based on game theory. In addition, the research is intended to identify the conditions for triggering deterrence from the perspective of the deterrence implementer and how the current government's policies contribute to strengthening the conditions for triggering U.S. extended deterrence. Ultimately, this study contends that the current government has increased the reputational costs of the United States through various diplomatic efforts, such as the Washington Declaration and the establishment of the NCG. Besides, the government also has strengthened the conventional forces to increase the likelihood of complete victory, thereby improving the possibility of the United States exercising extended deterrence.
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