전쟁에서 살육 행위의 정당성

Abstract

In this paper, I examine the well-known war theorist Jeff McMahan’s work Killing in War. He challenges the long-standing idea held by the traditional Just War Theorists. According to this idea, combatants on both sides possess the same moral status regardless of the justness or unjustness of their cause. Michael Walzer argues that all combatants have ‘an equal right to kill.’ McMahan, however, contends that there is a significant flaw in the notion that the criterion for liability to attack is solely based on posing a threat. In an ordinary context, it is incorrect to assume that posing a threat automatically makes one morally liable to defensive action. Similarly, McMahan argues that if a just combatant only poses a threat to unjust combatants, he cannot be morally liable for defensive action against them. Consequently, just combatants have the right to kill unjust combatants while the reverse does not hold true. This implies that their moral statuses are not equal. This argument contributes to the reevaluation of the rights of just combatants. However, it also raises another issue by undermining the existing principle of distinguishing between combatants and civilians in attacks. While I agree with McMahan’s defense against the concept of moral equality, I believe that there are limitations to his argument. I suggest that unjust combatants may have epistemological legitimacy in fulfilling their democratic obligations. Additionally, McMahan’s main example assumes the question of whether unjust combatants are liable and that his argumentative methodology overlooks the distinct contexts of war and peace.