한국과 미국의 공급사슬보안 생태계 비교 및 시사점 연구

Abstract

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, attention to global supply chain security(SCS) has increased. In addition, recent socioeconomic changes in Korea such as its inclusion in a list of potential terrorist targets by Islamic State, the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the Sewol ferry disaster, have prompted further review of SCS. In response, Korea has adopted the authorized economic operator(AEO) program. However, the rate of company participation to the AEO program is gradually shrinking. Therefore, this study aims to analyze whether the national SCS ecosystem is well formed and to determine methods to activate it. In particular, the study categorizes this ecosystem into government-private and company-company securities and uses game theory to analyze both. The government–private security game deals with customs clearance of cargoes that is modeled according to queuing theory, while the interaction between government and the private sector is descried as a principal–agent Stakelberg game. The outcomes of the game indicate that a scheme to overcome the differences of financial burden on private parties for AEO certification costs, according to the characteristics of their scales and types, is required. The study suggests two schemes. First, the AEO certification program should be expanded to include multiple companies as one unit, which can provide an advantage for small businesses as it would allow them to cooperate to overcome the security certification cost and demanding standards. Second, cooperation between customs-related authorities should be strengthened to provide a one-stop customs clearance with effective benefits for private sectors. The company–company security game is a three-player game dealing with interactions between manufacturers, logistics providers, and terrorists. In this game, manufacturers and logistics providers attempt to ensure their security by minimizing expected loss, while terrorists strive to maximize the probability of successful attacks. Thus, the strategies of the supply chain against terrorist attacks can be considered in terms of distributed or centralized. The outcomes of the game are follows. First, a measure to overcome the relative terror vulnerability of logistics providers compared to manufacturers is required: A national specialized logistics security program is required in which most logistics providers can participate regardless of their size and type. Second, a policy should be framed to integrate security activities of the supply chain so as to minimize national security costs without adversely impacting national security. Thus, this study’s significance is that it quantitatively shows that it is necessary to overcome the weakness of the current AEO program in order to vitalize the national SCS ecosystem, in accordance with the characteristics of business scale and type. In this way, the AEO program can encourage voluntary participation from private sector entities of various sizes and types, thereby enhancing the level of national security while minimizing related costs.