게임이론의 신호게임을 이용한 한국경제에 영향을 미치는 북한 미사일 문제에 관한 분석

Abstract

The Korean economy is affected not only by domestic and international factors, but also by North Korean risks. This study analyzes the North Korean missile launch problem as a signaling game, a form of dynamic game of incomplete information. We use perfect Bayesian equilibrium in order to analyze South Korea's desirable strategy to the North Korean missile launch problem. The type of North Korea is divided into aggressive and non-aggressive types, and North Korea's missile launch strategy is divided into a strategy of launching ballistic missiles that greatly heightened military tensions, and a strategy of launching radioactive artillery, a passive provocation that induces interest in North Korea issues. South Korea's response strategy in response to such a North Korean missile launch strategy can be a rapid military response and a hard-line response strategy that imposes strong sanctions, or a careful response strategy that relieves military tension and manages the situation stably. The pooling equilibrium that exists in the signaling game on the North Korean missile launch issue gives the following policy implications for the desirable countermeasures for South Korea's North Korean missile launch issue. In order to stably manage the North Korean risk related to the North Korean missile issue that affects the South Korean economy, the military provocation through the North Korean missile launch should be carried out through the ROK's hard-line countermeasures strategy, and a comprehensive strategy that enforces strong sanctions through international cooperation. By convincing North Korea that North Korea could suffers great damage form a military provocation that fires ballistic missiles, South Korea can prevent North Korean military provocations that strain the Korean Peninsula by firing ballistic missiles.