게임이론의 완전베이즈균형을 이용한한국경제전망에 관한 분석: 북핵협상을 중심으로

Abstract

Denuclearization of North Korea is the most urgent issue in understanding Korean economy. However, It is of a big mystery whether Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, truly wants to denuclearize the Korean peninsular. This paper analyzes denuclearization of North Korea in a game theoretic setting using the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We assume that North Korea can take on two different types unknown to South Korea, a counterpart agent. The first type is that North Korea wants to denuclearize the Korean peninsular. The second type is that North Korea does not abandon the nuclear weapon. We further assume that North Korea is the first mover and South Korea is the second mover. This makes our setting a dynamic game with incomplete information. In such setting, a separating equilibrium exists as follow. If North Korea wants to denuclearize truly, it tries to choose a progressive negotiation strategy. If North Korea does not want to abandon nuclear weapon eventually, it tries to choose a passive negotiation strategy. A more interesting equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium where North Korea tries to choose the progressive negotiation strategy regardless of the realized type of North Korea.