거부적 억제 수단으로서의 사이버 킬체인에 관한 연구; 스턱스넷 사이버 공격 사례를 중심으로

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the cyber kill chain, as a potential alternative to the Korean Kill Chain, can achieve denial deterrence and to identify the essential elements required for this. This study applies the concept of denial deterrence, traditionally a defensive concept, to cyberspace, arguing that proactive cyberattacks can instead degrade the enemy's capabilities and impose costs, thereby deterring their actions. By analyzing the Stuxnet case, which began infiltrating in 2009, this study confirmed that Stuxnet demonstrated the cyber kill chain attack process. Over a three-year period of infection attacks, it inflicted direct and indirect damage on Iran's nuclear centrifuges. However, the absence of clear communication and the lack of subsequent development and sustained attacks led to a failure in establishing credibility, ultimately hindering the achievement of long-term denial deterrence. This study suggests that the cyber kill chain has potential as an effective means of denial deterrence to hinder North Korea's nuclear and missile development. Cyber kill chains, like Stuxnet, exhibit a high level of stealth and can selectively inflict damage on desired targets at desired times through mechanisms such as C&C servers. However, sustained and systematic long-term cyber operations accompanied by strategic communication are essential. To achieve this, various infiltration methods can be utilized, and fictitious entities could be employed to facilitate deterrence-focused communication.