방송미디어통신위원회 직무독립성 확보를 위한 제언 - 舊 방송통신위원회 운영사례 검토를 중심으로 -

Abstract

This paper proposes the following institutional improvement measures to ensure the functional independence of the Korea Communications Commission (KCC). First, to address the problem of political confrontation between members nominated by the President and the ruling party and those recommended by the opposition parties, it is necessary to decentralize the power to nominate and recommend commissioners, which is currently concentrated in the President and the National Assembly. To this end, the scope of recommending authorities should be expanded, and a Candidate Recommendation Committee should be established to create a structure in which experts in broadcasting and telecommunications are recommended for appointment. Second, in order to secure procedural transparency and predictability in the appointment and commissioning process of the commissioners, the law should specifically provide for: (1) a time limit for appointment and commissioning, and the presumption of appointment after a certain period has elapsed; (2) the mandatory collective appointment of recommended commissioners; and (3) the explicit stipulation of the National Assembly’s deadline for recommendations. In addition, the appointing authority should review only the formal qualifications and disqualification requirements of the commissioners recommended by the National Assembly and refrain from conducting substantive reviews that could restrict or undermine the National Assembly’s authority to recommend. Accordingly, the Framework Act on the Establishment and Operation of the Korea Communications Commission (KCC Act) should be amended. Third, effective sanctions such as criminal penalties should be introduced against unjust instructions or interference from external sources, as well as improper directions or intervention within the KCC itself, to ensure independence in the performance of its duties. Fourth, to guarantee the political neutrality of commissioners, the law should clearly define “political involvement activities” by providing illustrative examples. This would enhance the predictability of what constitutes political involvement and minimize the possibility of arbitrary interpretation. Fifth, as a collegial administrative body, the KCC should be structured to reflect diverse opinions and encourage prudent deliberation. For major agenda items, the law should require that at least one commissioner nominated or recommended by each nominating authority (the President, the National Assembly, etc.) be included among those convening or opening meetings. Sixth, to strengthen the security of commissioners’ tenure, reference can be made to the systems of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the U.K. Office of Communications (Ofcom). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial officers cannot be removed for political reasons, and may only be dismissed for statutory grounds such as inefficiency, neglect of duty, or abuse of authority as prescribed by Congress. In the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) may dismiss a non-executive member of Ofcom only in writing and only when a statutory ground for dismissal is met, and the decision must be made public along with a written explanation provided to the individual concerned. Drawing upon these examples, the KCC should strengthen the protection of commissioners’ tenure by prohibiting the deprivation of their status on the grounds of corruption investigations prior to a final judicial decision, while clearly specifying in law the limited circumstances—such as conduct that seriously undermines the Commission’s functions—under which commissioners may be exceptionally removed from office.