On Physicalist Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of the Soul
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The prevalence of physicalism in recent philosophy of mind has led to the inception and strengthening of physicalist interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of the soul. Physicalists attempt to assimilate Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of the soul, which asserts the soul’s inseparability from the body,into an ontological dependence of the mental on the physical. But Aristotle’s view differs from any form of physicalism in three ways. First, his teleological explanation of movements of the soul cannot be reconciled with a material reductionist position. Second, Aristotle’s thesis of the separability of the intellect cannot be accommodated by attribution theory, even though attribution theory accepts the immateriality Aristotle attributes to the soul. And finally, because Aristotle’s intellect is a substance, it cannot be ontologically dependent on another kind of substance, and therefore it cannot be explained by substance supervenience theory, a version of supervenience theory that attempts to make room for the substantiality of the intellect within the framework of physicalism by suggesting that a substance can supervene on another kind of substance. Some physicalists argue that Aristotle’s theory of the soul is in fact incompatible with itself, i.e., that his hylomorphic account of the soul is in conflict with his thesis of the separability of the intellect from the body. But there is no incompatibility;for Aristotle, not every substance is a compound of matter and form, and the completion of his hylomorphism actually requires substance without matter.
Abstract
The prevalence of physicalism in recent philosophy of mind has led to the inception and strengthening of physicalist interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of the soul. Physicalists attempt to assimilate Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of the soul, which asserts the soul’s inseparability from the body,into an ontological dependence of the mental on the physical. But Aristotle’s view differs from any form of physicalism in three ways. First, his teleological explanation of movements of the soul cannot be reconciled with a material reductionist position. Second, Aristotle’s thesis of the separability of the intellect cannot be accommodated by attribution theory, even though attribution theory accepts the immateriality Aristotle attributes to the soul. And finally, because Aristotle’s intellect is a substance, it cannot be ontologically dependent on another kind of substance, and therefore it cannot be explained by substance supervenience theory, a version of supervenience theory that attempts to make room for the substantiality of the intellect within the framework of physicalism by suggesting that a substance can supervene on another kind of substance. Some physicalists argue that Aristotle’s theory of the soul is in fact incompatible with itself, i.e., that his hylomorphic account of the soul is in conflict with his thesis of the separability of the intellect from the body. But there is no incompatibility;for Aristotle, not every substance is a compound of matter and form, and the completion of his hylomorphism actually requires substance without matter.
참고문헌 (24)
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