Different Destinations on a Risky Voyage: American Military Advisors and the South Korean Army, 1948-1950
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
While suggesting a new perspective on the South Korean Army’s early collapse during the first stage of the Korean War, this paper examines the troubled relations between KMAG and the South Korean military leaders, which helps highlight the other deficiencies plaguing the South Korea Army and eventually leading to its rapid collapse. According to the newly available materials, the South Korean Army, in the period of formation and early growth, suffered from hasty and excessive expansion, serious factionalism, politicization of the officer corps, and communist infiltration into its ranks. More importantly, frequent and acute conflicts emerged in the relations between American military advisors and Korean officers as they struggled to create a South Korean armed force. These problems weakened the South Korean Army and enfeebled its response to the sudden attack of the North Korea. This paper challenges the dominant interpretation based mainly on the “superpower perspectives” which had prevailed during the Cold War period. Although U.S. policy failures in South Korea and North Korea’s readiness to attack based on Soviet support are still critical in understanding this topic, it suggests a new dimension to a now familiar story. The early collapse of the South Korean Army originated not only from the failures of national policy of both the United States and South Korea, but also from the failures at lower levels, particularly the military advisor-advisee relationship between KMAG and the South Korean Army. This paper also traces the process of trail and errors in the South Korean Army’s acceptance of American military culture. Although more successful relationships emerged after the Korean War started, the early experiences of trial and errors became the pivotal background of the full-scale South Korean military expansion program during the Korean War period.
Abstract
While suggesting a new perspective on the South Korean Army’s early collapse during the first stage of the Korean War, this paper examines the troubled relations between KMAG and the South Korean military leaders, which helps highlight the other deficiencies plaguing the South Korea Army and eventually leading to its rapid collapse. According to the newly available materials, the South Korean Army, in the period of formation and early growth, suffered from hasty and excessive expansion, serious factionalism, politicization of the officer corps, and communist infiltration into its ranks. More importantly, frequent and acute conflicts emerged in the relations between American military advisors and Korean officers as they struggled to create a South Korean armed force. These problems weakened the South Korean Army and enfeebled its response to the sudden attack of the North Korea. This paper challenges the dominant interpretation based mainly on the “superpower perspectives” which had prevailed during the Cold War period. Although U.S. policy failures in South Korea and North Korea’s readiness to attack based on Soviet support are still critical in understanding this topic, it suggests a new dimension to a now familiar story. The early collapse of the South Korean Army originated not only from the failures of national policy of both the United States and South Korea, but also from the failures at lower levels, particularly the military advisor-advisee relationship between KMAG and the South Korean Army. This paper also traces the process of trail and errors in the South Korean Army’s acceptance of American military culture. Although more successful relationships emerged after the Korean War started, the early experiences of trial and errors became the pivotal background of the full-scale South Korean military expansion program during the Korean War period.
참고문헌 (32)
- U.S. National Archives, "(College Park, Maryland) Modern Military Branch. Record of the Army Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 operations (Plans and Operations Division) 1946-1950", Record Group, 319
- U.S. National Archives, "Files of the Korean Military Advisory Group (8202 Army Unit) In: KMAG File", Record Group, 338
- U. S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the United States" (1977), U. S. Government Printing Office
- Hausman, James, "Hausman Heoikorok: Daetongreungul Umgikin Migun Daewei. (Hausman Memoirs: The American Captain Who Directed the President of the Republic of Korea)" (1995), Hankukmunwon
- Kim, Sukwon, "Nobungyui Han. (Autobiography: Regret’s of an Old Soldier)" (1977), Yukbupsa
- Kim, Woongsoo, "Interview by Jongnam Na" (2002)
- Lee, Han-lim, "Heoikorok: Seikiyi Gukrang. (Memoirs: The Violent Wave of the Times)" (1994), Palbokwon
- Lee, Hyong-kun, "Heoikorok: Gunbun Ilbunyi Weogil Insaeng. (Memoirs: Lonely Life of the Man Who Has the Service Number ‘1’)" (1993), Chungang ilbosa
- Paik, Sunyup, "Heoikorok: Kunkwa Na. (Memoirs: Army and I)" (1989), Daeruk yunguso Chulpanbu
- Ryu, Jaehung, "Heoikorok: Keukdongyei Seiwol. (Memoirs: Violent Times)" (1994), Yeulyou Munwhasa
- Atkins, Emery L., "Utilization of Indigenous Manpower in Korea" (1951), The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office
- Chung, To-woong, "The Role of the U.S. Occupation in the Creation of South Korean Armed Forces", 박사, pp.1985
- Coleman, Craig S, "American Images of Korea:Korea and Koreans as Portrayed in Books, Magazines, Television, News Media, and Film" (1990), Hollym
- Fishel, Wesley R., "Language Problems of the US Army during Hostilities in Korea" (1958), The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office
- Goulden, Joseph C, "Korea: The Untold Story of the War" (1982), Times Books
- Han, Youngwon, "Changgun. (Formation of the Army)" (1984), Parkyoungsa
- Hausrath, Alfred H., "The KMAG Advisor: Role and Problems of the Military Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Army for Combat Operations in Korea" (1957), The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office
- Herms, Walter G., "Survey of the Development of the Role of the U.S. Army Military Advisor" (1966), Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army
- Herring, George C., "America’s Longest War: The United State and Vietnam, 1950-1975. 3rd ed." (1979), McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
- Huh, Nam-sung, "The Quest for a Bulwark of Anti-communism: The Formation of the Republic of Korea Army Officer Corps and Its Political Socialization 1945-1950", 박사, pp.1987
- Korean Institute of Military History, "The Korean War" (1997), U of Nebraska P
- Lee, Young-woo, "The United States and the Formation of the Republic of Korea Army 1945‐1950", 박사, pp.1984
- Materi, Irma Tennant, "Irma and the Hermit: My Life in Korea" (1949), W. W. Norton & Company Inc.
- Park, Myung-Lim, "Hankuk chunchaeng yei Balbal kwa Kiwon. 2 Vols. (The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origin)" (1996), Nanam
- Sawyer, Robert K., "Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War" (1962), United States Army Center of Military History
- Schneider, Frederick W., "Advising the ARVN: Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams in Vietnam, 1955-1960", 석사, pp.1990
- Seoul Sinmun Sa, "Juhan Mikun Samsimyun: 1945-1978. (The U.S. Military in Korea for Thirty Years: 1945‐1978)" (1980), Heanglim Press
- Stueck, William, "The Korean War: An International History" (1995), Princeton UP
- The Association of Korean War Veterans, "Kukkunyei Puri. (Roots of the South Korean Army)" (1998), Samwoo-sa
- Yang, Youngjo, "Hanguk Junjaeng Iejun Sampaldosun Chongdol, 1945-1950. (Border Clashes on 38th Parallel Before the Korean War Period, 1945‐1950)" (1999), Korean Institute of Military History
- Yukbon Bonbu (HQ, ROK Army), "Changkun Junsa. (The History of the Korean Military prior to 1948)" (1980), Daehanminguk Yukkun Inshueichang
- Yukbon Bonbu (HQ, ROK Army), "Yukgun Baljonsa. 1945-July 1953. (History of the Development of the Republic of Korea Army)" (1961), Daehanminguk Yukkun Inshueichang