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주한미군사고문단(KMAG)의 한국전쟁 인식과 대응

The Recognition and Response of the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea about the Korean War

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국방부군사편찬연구소 (Military History Institute, MND)|2011.06|군사 (military history)|제79호|pp. 111-149|DOI 10.29212/mh.2011..79.111

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참고문헌

키워드

한국전쟁the Korean War국지도발Local Provocation전면전주한미군사고문단임시군사고문단주한미사절단극동군사령부작전명령 제38호상대역제도크럴러계획Provisional Military Advisory GroupU.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of KoreaAmerican Mission in KoreaHq. Far East CommandOperation Order No. 38Counterpart SystemPlan CrullerFull-scale War
주제분류역사학

초록

The purpose of this paper is to study KMAG's recognition and response about the Korean War. If summarizing what is examined in this manuscript, it is as follows. After the Truman Doctrine was announced in 1947, United States provided a military aid to a region except Europe and dispatched the U.S. Military Advisory Group. The U.S. Army Group was dispatched to Greece·Turkey·Iran, and the Provisional Military Advisory Group was installed in August24,1948in Korea.PMAG wasformally established as KMAG in July1, 1949, since with drawal of U.S.Army Force in Korea was complete. The U.S. Military Advisory Group was organized as a part of American Mission in Korea with the Embassy of United States in Korea and the Economic Cooperation Administration(ECA) and received control of Ambassador of United States in Korea KMAG selected all fields related to the Korean Army such as organization, operation, education and training, and logistics as a domain of activities, and accomplished their plan and decisions to the Korean Army through a “CounterpartSystem". Activities of the U.S. Military Advisory Group has developed while varying its scope and emphasis according to United States' military policy to Korea and changes of the situation of Korea, and continued changes in a command channel and scale by corresponding to it. Before the Korean War, activities of KMAG laid emphasis on training and educational guidance, and anti-guerilla warfare of the Korean Army. Training guidance of the U.S. Military Advisory Group can be summarized as reinforcement of unit's tactical training and training education of commanders. The training plan on the Korean Army that the U.S. Military Advisory Group planned was not properly performed, and training results were also not good, but there was a meaning in that the first systematic American-styletraining on the Korean Army was carried out. In relation with operational support, it had direct influence on support of anti-guerilla warfare and establishment of a defense plan of the Korean Army. The U.S. military Advisory Group evaluated the result of winter subjugation operation against guerrillas during 1949~50 as 'very successful'. The U.S. Military Advisory Group took a defensive position on the 38th parallel's dispute, unlike active intervention in subjugation operation against guerrillas. United States tried to properly controlthe Korean War through KMAG, while opposing assertion of going-north of the Korean Government actively. The defense plan of the Korean Army that KMAG visualized in this stand point was connected to an 'operation order No.38 of the Head quarter of the Army'. Its core content was a defense plan against 'local provocation' of the North Korean Army instead of preparing a full-scale war. Even if KMAG sensed a war symptom such as reinforcement of military strength and forward deployment to the 38th parallel of the North Korean Army before outbreak of the Korean War, it was convinced that it would never be connected to a full-scale war. As soon as the Korean War broke out due to this, organization of KMAG was seriously collapsed, and confusion was generated even in a command system, Councilors dispatched to forward units had withdrawn from the battle line in June 25~26. Withdrawal of councilors accelerated weakening of fighting power by rapidly spreading recognition like "United States gave up Korea" inside the Korean Army. What councilors again returned to the battle line was around July 4, 1950. At this time, the KMAG headquarters completed existing official duties and converted its duties into concentration on operational guidance of the Korean Army. In July 8,1950, an order that makes councilors consider direct command of the Korean Army was delivered to councilors.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study KMAG's recognition and response about the Korean War. If summarizing what is examined in this manuscript, it is as follows. After the Truman Doctrine was announced in 1947, United States provided a military aid to a region except Europe and dispatched the U.S. Military Advisory Group. The U.S. Army Group was dispatched to Greece·Turkey·Iran, and the Provisional Military Advisory Group was installed in August24,1948in Korea.PMAG wasformally established as KMAG in July1, 1949, since with drawal of U.S.Army Force in Korea was complete. The U.S. Military Advisory Group was organized as a part of American Mission in Korea with the Embassy of United States in Korea and the Economic Cooperation Administration(ECA) and received control of Ambassador of United States in Korea KMAG selected all fields related to the Korean Army such as organization, operation, education and training, and logistics as a domain of activities, and accomplished their plan and decisions to the Korean Army through a “CounterpartSystem". Activities of the U.S. Military Advisory Group has developed while varying its scope and emphasis according to United States' military policy to Korea and changes of the situation of Korea, and continued changes in a command channel and scale by corresponding to it. Before the Korean War, activities of KMAG laid emphasis on training and educational guidance, and anti-guerilla warfare of the Korean Army. Training guidance of the U.S. Military Advisory Group can be summarized as reinforcement of unit's tactical training and training education of commanders. The training plan on the Korean Army that the U.S. Military Advisory Group planned was not properly performed, and training results were also not good, but there was a meaning in that the first systematic American-styletraining on the Korean Army was carried out. In relation with operational support, it had direct influence on support of anti-guerilla warfare and establishment of a defense plan of the Korean Army. The U.S. military Advisory Group evaluated the result of winter subjugation operation against guerrillas during 1949~50 as 'very successful'. The U.S. Military Advisory Group took a defensive position on the 38th parallel's dispute, unlike active intervention in subjugation operation against guerrillas. United States tried to properly controlthe Korean War through KMAG, while opposing assertion of going-north of the Korean Government actively. The defense plan of the Korean Army that KMAG visualized in this stand point was connected to an 'operation order No.38 of the Head quarter of the Army'. Its core content was a defense plan against 'local provocation' of the North Korean Army instead of preparing a full-scale war. Even if KMAG sensed a war symptom such as reinforcement of military strength and forward deployment to the 38th parallel of the North Korean Army before outbreak of the Korean War, it was convinced that it would never be connected to a full-scale war. As soon as the Korean War broke out due to this, organization of KMAG was seriously collapsed, and confusion was generated even in a command system, Councilors dispatched to forward units had withdrawn from the battle line in June 25~26. Withdrawal of councilors accelerated weakening of fighting power by rapidly spreading recognition like "United States gave up Korea" inside the Korean Army. What councilors again returned to the battle line was around July 4, 1950. At this time, the KMAG headquarters completed existing official duties and converted its duties into concentration on operational guidance of the Korean Army. In July 8,1950, an order that makes councilors consider direct command of the Korean Army was delivered to councilors.

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