국적항공사간 단수취항노선 배분방법으로서의 점수입찰제에 대한 게임이론적 고찰
A Game theoretic Analysis of the Point Bidding Scheme in the Allocation of Singly Designated Routes between to International Airlines
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The point bidding scheme has often been recommended as an allocation measured of the singly designated international routes among the competing air carriers. In the scheme, each airline is given an identical number and this is used to bid for the routes obtained through intergovernmental negotiations over a given period of time. In this paper, we set up a game theoretic model in which two airlines compete over singly designated routes under the point bidding scheme. It turns out that, to the contrary to the belief of many experts who believe its efficiency, the scheme does not produce any pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The only exception is when two routes are on bid. Efficiency is not in general guarantied.
Abstract
The point bidding scheme has often been recommended as an allocation measured of the singly designated international routes among the competing air carriers. In the scheme, each airline is given an identical number and this is used to bid for the routes obtained through intergovernmental negotiations over a given period of time. In this paper, we set up a game theoretic model in which two airlines compete over singly designated routes under the point bidding scheme. It turns out that, to the contrary to the belief of many experts who believe its efficiency, the scheme does not produce any pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The only exception is when two routes are on bid. Efficiency is not in general guarantied.