불교 트랜스휴머니즘에 대한 성리학적 고찰

Abstract

This paper critically examines the concept of human enhancement in Buddhist Transhumanism from a Neo-Confucian perspective, with a particular focus on James Hughes’s “Cyborg Buddha Project.” Buddhist Transhumanism holds that Buddhist ideals such as Nirvāṇa (liberation), compassion, and wisdom can be realized more quickly and reliably through modern technologies such as biotechnology, neurotechnology, and artificial intelligence. In particular, Hughes argues that technologies can facilitate the elimination of greed, hatred, and ignorance and enable experiences of non-self, thereby functioning as tools to accelerate the path to liberation. He asserts that it is possible to enhance concentration, self-control, and compassion through techniques like brain stimulation and emotion-regulating drugs. This line of thought is understood as a modern extension of traditional Buddhist practices in which technology contributes to the dissolution of self and the cultivation of ethical insight. However, Neo-Confucianism consistently raises objections to such claims made by Buddhist Transhumanism. Most notably, the two traditions fundamentally diverge in their understandings of the body and self. Neo-Confucianism views the self as a moral agent responsible for realizing Tianli(天理), and sees moral character development as the core of human enhancement. In contrast, Buddhist Transhumanism, grounded in the notion of non-self, regards the self merely as a process without permanent substance. Imaginings of self-immortality found in cyborg integration, mind uploading, or AI convergence are at odds not only with Neo-Confucian ethics but also with the Buddhist principle of dependent origination. Moreover, although Hughes allows for the use of drugs and machines as technical aids to meditation, Neo-Confucianism, with its emphasis on the ethical process and continuity of self-cultivation, is critical of such shortcuts. From the Neo-Confucian standpoint, truth must be realized through continuous effort such as Qiongli (窮理, investigation of principle) and Jujing(居敬, reverent mindfulness). Instant enlightenment(頓悟) in the Buddhist tradition is seen as nothing more than momentary immersion. Genuine self-cultivation, in this view, must integrate moral introspection and ethical practice. Technologically assisted practices risk undermining the essence and agency of spiritual cultivation. Furthermore, this paper points out that the aims of human enhancement in Transhumanism—such as life extension, memory augmentation, increased self-control, and emotional regulation—though seemingly directed toward alleviating suffering and supporting spiritual practice, may in fact reinforce a new form of “attachment to existence,” which Buddhism itself seeks to transcend. If technological enhancement compromises the universality and equality of spiritual access, it could conflict with fundamental Buddhist ideals of compassion and liberation. Finally, Hughes argues that institutional responses are needed to prevent Transhumanism from devolving into a form of individualistic enhancement. He believes that Buddhist communal values—such as compassion, empathy, and equanimity—can serve as ethical frameworks to guide technological progress in a human-centered direction. He advocates for public policy and social systems to manage the ethical implications of technological human enhancement. In sum, this paper analyzes how the technology-based practices and enhancement concepts proposed by Buddhist Transhumanism conflict with Neo-Confucian theories of self-cultivation and moral agency, while also acknowledging points of shared ethical aspiration. While technology may be used as an auxiliary means of practice, from a Neo-Confucian perspective, it must not replace the core of spiritual cultivation nor undermine the ethical formation of the self.