태국의 탁씬 정부와 군부 쿠데타
Thaksin Shinawatra's Government and Military Coup
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This paper focuses on the causes of the September 19 military coup which toppled the Thaksin Shinawatra's Government. It was found that many kinds of variables are involved with the Coup. In terms of external or pull factors related to the military intervention in politics, the weakness of civilian political institutions and the low level of legitimacy of civilian governments, are the most fundamental reasons for the Coup. Even though with the political progress since 1980s', no political groups could be established effectively enough to challenge the military's political dominance. The low level of legitimacy of civilian authoritarian Thaksin's government is another crucial factor leading to the Coup. There are varied factors, that weakened the civilian government's legitimacy such as the violation of human rights, invalid April 2 general election, unfavourable relationship with the King and the mass media, corruption and nepotism etc. In terms of internal or push factors, the Coup also depends on the strength of the armed forces and military interests. Even though the Thai military power has been diminished since May 1992 which was called Black May, It has still several political resources which had made make it stronger: strong organization, control of Internal Security Operations Command, wealth through Thai Military Bank, control of mass communications media like TV and radio stations etc. Certainly, it is easy for the Thai military with these political advantages to intervene in politics. The invasion of the military's institutional interests by the Government such as autonomy is another factor. The Thaksin's intervention in the regular yearly military promotion for his faction built the unfavourable mood in the military. The factional interests mainly composed of the military's invested political and economic interests did not play an important role in the Coup as it has played in the past
Abstract
This paper focuses on the causes of the September 19 military coup which toppled the Thaksin Shinawatra's Government. It was found that many kinds of variables are involved with the Coup. In terms of external or pull factors related to the military intervention in politics, the weakness of civilian political institutions and the low level of legitimacy of civilian governments, are the most fundamental reasons for the Coup. Even though with the political progress since 1980s', no political groups could be established effectively enough to challenge the military's political dominance. The low level of legitimacy of civilian authoritarian Thaksin's government is another crucial factor leading to the Coup. There are varied factors, that weakened the civilian government's legitimacy such as the violation of human rights, invalid April 2 general election, unfavourable relationship with the King and the mass media, corruption and nepotism etc. In terms of internal or push factors, the Coup also depends on the strength of the armed forces and military interests. Even though the Thai military power has been diminished since May 1992 which was called Black May, It has still several political resources which had made make it stronger: strong organization, control of Internal Security Operations Command, wealth through Thai Military Bank, control of mass communications media like TV and radio stations etc. Certainly, it is easy for the Thai military with these political advantages to intervene in politics. The invasion of the military's institutional interests by the Government such as autonomy is another factor. The Thaksin's intervention in the regular yearly military promotion for his faction built the unfavourable mood in the military. The factional interests mainly composed of the military's invested political and economic interests did not play an important role in the Coup as it has played in the past
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