Informational Disadvantage and Bargaining Power
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We consider an alternating offer model where the size of the to-tal surplus is stochastic. Furthermore, the size changes during the time when the offer is being considered. As a result the responder may obtain more information than the proposer. We analyze how the asymmetry in ability to access good information affects the bargaining power, both in terms of the resulting share and in terms of the delay in agreement.
Abstract
We consider an alternating offer model where the size of the to-tal surplus is stochastic. Furthermore, the size changes during the time when the offer is being considered. As a result the responder may obtain more information than the proposer. We analyze how the asymmetry in ability to access good information affects the bargaining power, both in terms of the resulting share and in terms of the delay in agreement.
참고문헌 (6)
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