공감, 정의, 그리고 연대: 흄의 공감이론과 정의론에 비추어 본 연대성의 도덕적 기반

Abstract

In this paper, I seek to respond to the critique that, while Hume’s theory of sympathy provides a potential moral foundation for solidarity, it nonetheless fails to adequately account for collective responsibility and political agency. To address this concern, I begin by analyzing Hume’s account of sympathy in the Treatise of Human Nature as the affective grounding of solidarity and by tracing the process through which sympathy evolves into justice via shared social experiences and the internalization of norms. I then turn to contemporary philosophers Margaret Gilbert and P. F. Strawson, both of whom critically inherit Hume’s sentimentalist framework while highlighting the need for elements beyond sympathy for solidarity to function meaningfully within real social and political contexts. Gilbert locates the core of solidarity in collective subjectivity formed through joint commitment. For her, a group is not merely an aggregation of individuals but is constituted through mutually binding obligations—an implicit or explicit agreement that “we will act together as one.” Solidarity, therefore, is more than the sharing of emotion; it is a normative relationship in which each member is entitled to hold others to account. Moral emotions such as collective guilt reveal that individuals are morally implicated in the actions of their group. In this way, Gilbert supplements Hume’s sympathy-based account by articulating the institutional and normative dimensions of the moral community that Hume under-theorized. Strawson, by contrast, explains solidarity through the dynamics of interpersonal reactive attitudes, such as resentment, gratitude, and forgiveness. He argues that morality arises not from the sentiments of a detached observer but from relationships in which individuals regard one another as responsible agents who exchange legitimate expectations and demands. Solidarity, on this view, is sustained by the capacity to experience another’s suffering or injustice as one’s own and to respond with appropriate emotional reactions—anger, indignation, gratitude, forgiveness—which can motivate political engagement and collective action. Thus, Strawson elucidates the affective mechanisms by which solidarity becomes practically operative. Both Gilbert and Strawson extend Hume’s insights while emphasizing different aspects of solidarity: Gilbert prioritizes collective will and responsibility, whereas Strawson foregrounds mutual recognition and emotional responsiveness. By synthesizing these perspectives, this paper argues that solidarity emerges through three interwoven layers: the extension of sympathy (affect), the establishment of joint commitment (normativity), and the cultivation of moral responsiveness (practice). Solidarity, thus reconceived, becomes a moral relationship that entails not only feeling together but also taking responsibility together and acting together—moving beyond mere compassion or shared sentiment.