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병자호란 이후(1640~1642년) 쓰시마에 대한 조선의 입체적인 교섭 논리: 1640년 문위행과 이후 파생된 교섭을 중심으로

The Joseon’s Multi-Layered Response toward Tsushima after the Manchu Invasion of the Joseon in 1636(丙子胡亂)

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After the Manchu Invasion of the Joseon in 1636(丙子胡亂), the Qing began to exercise the pressure the Joseon in three different ways: arranging relations between the Qing and the Japan, sending huge amount of annual tributary payment(歲幣), and mobilizing soldiers and weapons to fight against the Ming. Firstly, the Joseon made it very clear that they will never pay the role of an intermediary between the Qing and the Japan helping them to initiate the diplomatic relations, after which they leaked the false information about the Japan to the Qing. The leakage, made of lies, includes that the Japan was not in a suitable environment to have a relationship with the Qing. For example, the Japan being far away from the sea to exchange envoys with, or the Japan being suspicious with likelihood of preparing a war against the Continent, like the Japanese Invasion of the Joseon in 1592(壬辰倭亂). The second and third pressures of the Qing were difficult to deal with due to the exhaustion of the Joseon’s resources after the war. Especially annual tributary payment, the Joseon had to seek constant and stable routes to procure goods from overseas because the Qing included items that could only be obtained by importing them. In addition, annual tributary payment and sending troops, which were very burdensome for the Joseon to afford, often ignited various diplomatic problems with the Qing. This made the Joseon gradually realize that they were in an uneasy position to safeguard their interest in the East Asia. This difficult situations caused by the Qing affected the negotiation attitude of the Tsushima(對馬) in south. Its intelligence capabilities reached the Northwestern(關西) region of the Joseon, linking the northern situation related to the Qing with negotiations from the south. The Tsushima recognized that the Joseon was in a position under pressures from the Qing, and used it in their favor in the negotiations with Joseon, making opportunities to go in a offensive way. In this ‘Northern Barbarian and Southern Wako(北虜南倭)’ situation, the Joseon responded to the Tsushima in two directions. As the Joseon sought a breakthrough for managing the Qing’s demands using the Japan, the Joseon counteracted the aggressive Tsushima, utilizing the Qing’s pressures in their favor. The complex responses were revealed by the Joseon’s multi-layered negotiation logics. The Joseon had to establish a logic to resolve economic and military pressures of the Qing through the Japan, ensuring it less explicit that the Joseon was under such pressures from the Qing or that the Joseon obeyed the Qing as a tributary state(朝貢國). The Joseon began it with the logic that ‘Trade with the Ming was inevitably cut off because the Qing made the surrendered the Ming admirals attack the Ga-island(椵島) and territory of Yyodong(遼東), resulting in the Joseon were no longer able to receive the gold and weapons in the exchange of the Ming. So we ask the Tsushima the gold’. Moreover, the Joseon completed their negotiation logics not by mentioning annual tributary payment but by adding a lie with plausible cause of requesting the gold necessary for ornaments or medicinal materials to the Tsushima. At the same time, with the diplomatic abilities and strategy, the Joseon managed the Tsushima cleverly when they tried to scrutinize the situations in the Joseon to find out what the Joseon was hiding to them. Additionally, due to the affair of forgery of diplomatic documents in the Tushima(柳川一件), negotiation attitude of the Tsushima also changed making the Joseon’s response logic more multi-layered. The Tsushima’s initial attitude of maximizing the Shogunate(將軍)’s interests, expectations, and authority toward the negotiation with the Joseon was more often witnessed. However, the Joseon did not tolerate this either and established a new negotiation logic.

Abstract

After the Manchu Invasion of the Joseon in 1636(丙子胡亂), the Qing began to exercise the pressure the Joseon in three different ways: arranging relations between the Qing and the Japan, sending huge amount of annual tributary payment(歲幣), and mobilizing soldiers and weapons to fight against the Ming. Firstly, the Joseon made it very clear that they will never pay the role of an intermediary between the Qing and the Japan helping them to initiate the diplomatic relations, after which they leaked the false information about the Japan to the Qing. The leakage, made of lies, includes that the Japan was not in a suitable environment to have a relationship with the Qing. For example, the Japan being far away from the sea to exchange envoys with, or the Japan being suspicious with likelihood of preparing a war against the Continent, like the Japanese Invasion of the Joseon in 1592(壬辰倭亂). The second and third pressures of the Qing were difficult to deal with due to the exhaustion of the Joseon’s resources after the war. Especially annual tributary payment, the Joseon had to seek constant and stable routes to procure goods from overseas because the Qing included items that could only be obtained by importing them. In addition, annual tributary payment and sending troops, which were very burdensome for the Joseon to afford, often ignited various diplomatic problems with the Qing. This made the Joseon gradually realize that they were in an uneasy position to safeguard their interest in the East Asia. This difficult situations caused by the Qing affected the negotiation attitude of the Tsushima(對馬) in south. Its intelligence capabilities reached the Northwestern(關西) region of the Joseon, linking the northern situation related to the Qing with negotiations from the south. The Tsushima recognized that the Joseon was in a position under pressures from the Qing, and used it in their favor in the negotiations with Joseon, making opportunities to go in a offensive way. In this ‘Northern Barbarian and Southern Wako(北虜南倭)’ situation, the Joseon responded to the Tsushima in two directions. As the Joseon sought a breakthrough for managing the Qing’s demands using the Japan, the Joseon counteracted the aggressive Tsushima, utilizing the Qing’s pressures in their favor. The complex responses were revealed by the Joseon’s multi-layered negotiation logics. The Joseon had to establish a logic to resolve economic and military pressures of the Qing through the Japan, ensuring it less explicit that the Joseon was under such pressures from the Qing or that the Joseon obeyed the Qing as a tributary state(朝貢國). The Joseon began it with the logic that ‘Trade with the Ming was inevitably cut off because the Qing made the surrendered the Ming admirals attack the Ga-island(椵島) and territory of Yyodong(遼東), resulting in the Joseon were no longer able to receive the gold and weapons in the exchange of the Ming. So we ask the Tsushima the gold’. Moreover, the Joseon completed their negotiation logics not by mentioning annual tributary payment but by adding a lie with plausible cause of requesting the gold necessary for ornaments or medicinal materials to the Tsushima. At the same time, with the diplomatic abilities and strategy, the Joseon managed the Tsushima cleverly when they tried to scrutinize the situations in the Joseon to find out what the Joseon was hiding to them. Additionally, due to the affair of forgery of diplomatic documents in the Tushima(柳川一件), negotiation attitude of the Tsushima also changed making the Joseon’s response logic more multi-layered. The Tsushima’s initial attitude of maximizing the Shogunate(將軍)’s interests, expectations, and authority toward the negotiation with the Joseon was more often witnessed. However, the Joseon did not tolerate this either and established a new negotiation logic.

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