한국인의 북방 영토 인식
Koreans’ Perception of the Northern Border Area
0
조회
0
다운로드
3
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
In this thesis presented several features of the main discussion is as follows. First, the Korean perception of the northern boundary is not clear, because it is divided in the Yalu-Tumen River or 38th ceasefire line. To the lower generation, 38th line tends to be perceived as boundary of the north border. Second, about 67% of Koreans are aware of the Gando, and around 45% know that Gando is currently the territory of China as Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture. In particular, little of over the age of 60 were aware of Gando, given that the Gando issue is opened as the discourse of Korean society in earnest after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China. Third, as far as the claim to Gando is concerned, only 28.6 % of Koreans think that Gando belongs to Korea. The territorial consciousness of Gando, however, is strong among those who had higher education and knew the Gando Agreement. Interestingly, there is some inconsistencies between territorial consciousness of Gando and awareness of Korea's northern border. Many Koreans who know Gando and think that Gando is under the Korean sovereignty, consider the Yalu-Tumen River Line as the Korean north border. Fourth, the possibilities of returning Gando to Korea are not large. Among those who consider Gando as territory of Korea, not much more than 42.2%(20.1% of the total sample) think about the possibility of attribution of Gando to Korea positively. Nevertheless, the more people get the knowledge of Gando Agreement, the higher is the prospect of returning Gando to Korea. It seems indirectly to imply the injustice of the Gando agreement. Fifth, the government of South Korea doesn't claim sovereignty over the Gando to China. There are pros and cons(45.6%) for it. One of the most significant reasons of no action of the Korean government is the possibility of worsening relations with China. Only 23.0% insist sovereignty over the Gando, despite all these. Sixth, for Koreans, condominium of both Korea and China is the most preferable solution of the Gando problem. And the most urgent measure for South Korean government to do is to support the survival and maintenance of Korean Culture in Gando. Seventh, it is worth remembering there is a tendency in which the Gando issue is considered to be more important than the Korean unification. With regard to South and North Korea unification issues, this has implications that the consciousness of the need for unity is weakening.
Abstract
In this thesis presented several features of the main discussion is as follows. First, the Korean perception of the northern boundary is not clear, because it is divided in the Yalu-Tumen River or 38th ceasefire line. To the lower generation, 38th line tends to be perceived as boundary of the north border. Second, about 67% of Koreans are aware of the Gando, and around 45% know that Gando is currently the territory of China as Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture. In particular, little of over the age of 60 were aware of Gando, given that the Gando issue is opened as the discourse of Korean society in earnest after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China. Third, as far as the claim to Gando is concerned, only 28.6 % of Koreans think that Gando belongs to Korea. The territorial consciousness of Gando, however, is strong among those who had higher education and knew the Gando Agreement. Interestingly, there is some inconsistencies between territorial consciousness of Gando and awareness of Korea's northern border. Many Koreans who know Gando and think that Gando is under the Korean sovereignty, consider the Yalu-Tumen River Line as the Korean north border. Fourth, the possibilities of returning Gando to Korea are not large. Among those who consider Gando as territory of Korea, not much more than 42.2%(20.1% of the total sample) think about the possibility of attribution of Gando to Korea positively. Nevertheless, the more people get the knowledge of Gando Agreement, the higher is the prospect of returning Gando to Korea. It seems indirectly to imply the injustice of the Gando agreement. Fifth, the government of South Korea doesn't claim sovereignty over the Gando to China. There are pros and cons(45.6%) for it. One of the most significant reasons of no action of the Korean government is the possibility of worsening relations with China. Only 23.0% insist sovereignty over the Gando, despite all these. Sixth, for Koreans, condominium of both Korea and China is the most preferable solution of the Gando problem. And the most urgent measure for South Korean government to do is to support the survival and maintenance of Korean Culture in Gando. Seventh, it is worth remembering there is a tendency in which the Gando issue is considered to be more important than the Korean unification. With regard to South and North Korea unification issues, this has implications that the consciousness of the need for unity is weakening.
참고문헌 (20)
- 김도회, "헌법의 영토와 통일조항 개정론에 대한 비판적 검토", 헌법학연구, 12(4), pp.49~ (2006)
- 김종건, "백두산, 간도 역사 연구의 현황과 쟁점", 동북아역사논총, (18), pp.65~141 (2007), 동북아역사재단
- 김원웅, "간도백서: 간도영유권에 관한 역사적 법적 논거를 중심으로", pp.105~ (2004), 김원웅의원실
- 나인균, "한국헌법의 영토조항과 국적문제", 헌법논총, 5, pp.476~ (1994), 헌법재판소
- 이성환, "간도는 누구의 땅인가", pp.1~30 (2005), 살림출판사
- 이성환, "간도 영유권 문제 해결을 위한 시론(時論)적 연구 - ‘간도협약’의 재검토를 통해서 -", 동북아 문화연구, 1(14), pp.563~588 (2008), 동북아시아문화학회
- 이창주, "중원대륙의 한민족사-조선족의 과거 현재 미래", pp.25~45 (2011), 우리시대
- 이화자, "한중국경사연구", pp.1~225 (2011), 혜안
- 한명섭, "남북통일과 북한이 체결한 국경조약의 승계", pp.37~40 (2011), 한국학술정보
- "통일후 조선족 분리운동 우려 중국, 고구려史 의도적 왜곡 ‘타임’ 아시아판 보도", 조선일 보 2004. 8.18, ~ (2004)
- "産徑新聞(2011. 7 31)", ~ (2011)
- "조선일보 2004. 10. 15", ~ (2004)
- "한겨레 신문 2004. 10. 23", ~ (2004)
- "아시아투데이 2009.9.2", ~ (2009)
- "간도학회 홈페이지"[URL]
- "간도되찾기 운동본부 홈페이지"[URL]
