감성과 취미에 관한 흄의 견해

Abstract

This study aims at an inquiry about the position and functions of sentiments and tastes that are underlying Hume's theory of knowledge, morality and beauty. A fundamental view in this study is that a consistent theme throughout Hume's philosophy is sentiment not reason. sentiment that plays an significant part in Hume's epistemology and moral theory becomes related with even the matter of judgement, which provides a foundation that all of Hume's philosophy can be viewed from the perspective of sentiment. In brief, by considering discussions about epistemic judgements, moral judgements and aesthetic judgements Hume proposed and exposing how sentiment functions in such discussions, a suggestion that Hume's philosophy can be re-illuminated in terms of sentiment is what this paper attempts to make. The study first of all, focuses on the effect of sentiment on epistemic judgements about the matters of truth and false in Hume's philosophy(Section 1 in Chapter 3), and clarifies the fact that sentiment works in imagination and in the foundation of conviction about Hume's natural belief. Next in Section 2 in Chapter 3, an important position of sentiment in moral judgements related with the matters of right and wrong is addressed. The significant position of sentiment in the area is well presented in Hume's attitude that he tries to find the foundation of moral judgements from moral sentiment. Finally, in Chapter 4, sentiment that serves a significant role in aesthetic judgement related to beauty and ugly is dealt. In this area, the faculty of sentiment is, that is to say, taste or aesthetic sentiment. Before addressing the main arguments, classification and meanings of various terms surrounding Emotion used in modern philosophy during 17th and 18 centuries are highlighted.