삼위일체에 관한 Al Kindī 철학과 Yaḥyā Ibn ‘Adī의 철학의 비교 연구

Abstract

In this article I deal with the debates between an Islamic philosopher and a Christian philosopher in the eighth century on the Trinity, examining how the Trinity formula developed in Islamic philosophy. This focuses especially on the debates of al-Kindī and Yaḥyā Ibn 'Adī. Al-Kindī is attacking the Trinity concept in three ways. ① The three hypostaseis constitute a single Ousia, and these constituent things cannot be eternal because they are individuals. So they cannot become an eternal god. ② When Ousia becomes the subject and the three hypostaseis become the predicate, they must be one of either the genera, the species, or the differentiae. But it does not belong to any one of them. Thus, the relation of substance and the attribute do not fit to that of Ousia and hypostaseis. ③ According to Aristotle, the one means the same, which implies that it is the same as the species, the genera, and the number. The three hypostaseis do not belong to any one of them. Therefore, it cannot be said that Ousia and hypostaseis are the same. Yaḥyā Ibn 'Adī argues against this claim as follows. With regard to (1) and (2), it is possible to argue that hypostaseis constitutes Ousia, but they are constituent elements that have never been separated from Ousia. Thus, a composition without an eternal cause is possible. ③ Aristotle suggests the meaning of 'one' and the concept that Christians use in the Trinity concept are different. Yaḥyā Ibn 'Adī pointed out six meanings of one, of which he chose the following two sentences, "one essence is one, the name is one, and one is the subject, but the definition predicate is multiple," suggesting one as a concept of the Trinity. Nevertheless, there is a logical limit to the claim of Yaḥyā Ibn 'Adī. ① If you think of the plurality of hypostaseis which has one essence, but has plurality of names, then the second and third hypostaseis are not substances but names. ② The essence of the meanings becomes a problem when the meaning of one is both one subject and plurality of the definitional predicate. It does not fit into the Trinity concept if the meanings are either physical objects or intellectual concepts. Then why had they tried to establish the formula of the Trinity, even though they had known that it would be fail? The answer may be that the Trinity is a mystery itself, and the descriptions of the Trinity are not an attempt to solve the mystery, but an attempt to stop it from being accused of being contradictory and pointless. They may be experimenting with how they can direct the majority through the "one" predicate in various ways as intellectual play.