덕 인식론의 관점에서 본 지(智)와 지각(知覺)의 문제 : 성리학에서 지적인 덕에 관한 두 입장의 현대적 해석

Abstract

In this article, I will shed light on the whole phases, characteristics, and philosophical implications of traditional discussions on ji (智) and jigak (知覺) in the Seongnihak (性理學) from the perspective of virtue epistemology (VE hereafter), which is a trend of contemporary epistemology. As VE is divided into two positions in relation to the concept of intellectual virtue, we can understand the history of Confucian philosophy by distinguishing between the following two standpoints: the one sees jigak (cognitive abilities) as intellectual virtue but the other sees ji (wisdom) as intellectual virtue. Although Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200) integrated these two positions, he was in favor of the latter and deepened it. In the Korean Neo-Confuciansm, Yi Hwang (李滉, 1501-1570) regarded ji as intellectual virtue from the internalist standpoint, whereas Yi I (李珥, 1536-1584) as the defender of externalism thought that jigak actually corresponded to the intellectual virtue. In the late Joseon (朝鮮) dynasty, internalists and externalists started to admit part of each other's view existing in interactions between them. Kim Changhyup (金昌協, 1651-1708) pursued the compromise between internalism and externalism, but in the long run he strengthened the position to regard jigak as intellectual virtue. In contrast, Yi Ik (李瀷, 1681-1763) clarified his own standpoint to regard ji as intellectual virtue while accepting a portion of naturalistic inclination of externalism. These two positions concerning ji and jigak tended to show more and more characteristics and tendencies of VE as time went on toward the late Joseon. Therefore, we can understand much more about intellectual virtue through the comparative research between VE and the doctrines of ji and jigak in the Seongnihak.