살 존재론의 ‘새로움’에 대한 재해석 :하이데거를 경유하여

Abstract

Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is constantly confronted with the dichotomous system of traditional philosophy. His The Phenomenologie de la Perception criticizes all objectivist philosophies by the ambiguity of the phenomenological field revealed by perception, this attempt ends ontologically with the ontological primordiality of the flesh revealed in The Le visible et l’invisible. At that moment, the key word supporting his philosophy can be considered as the pre-verbal unity of the subject and the world, and therefore, for him, the flesh becomes an ontological motif that allows this unity. Merleau-Ponty himself qualifies this ontology of the flesh as a “new ontology”. However, the "newness" of the ontology of the flesh is not simply in the fundamental unity itself. This is because the critique of traditional metaphysics of contemporary philosophy is already in the clarification of the origin of being. Therefore, the novelty of the ontology of the flesh can be truly “new” when it is found in the movement of differentiation of beings that unfolds from its source. Ultimately, for Merleau-Ponty's ontology of flesh to be a "new" ontology, we must confirm the divergence between the ontology of flesh and contemporary ontology, and we define divergence as the difference between the ontological perspectives of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, that is to say the differentiation of beings, we find it in the attitude of Merleau-Ponty who emphasizes reversibility as a description of the instantaneous instant. The movement of this existence, which is a description of the moment when the experience occurs, is the event "occurrence" of existence in the sense of Merleau-Ponty, and this is the reason why its ontology can be a “new” ontology.