‘Coercive Cooperation’ in Action: Explaining South Korea’s Non-proliferation Financing Regime
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
Inducing cooperation from hesitant members in a sanctioning coalition is critical for effective implementation of a financial sanction. Strategic cooperation among states with divergent interests involves time inconsistency and incomplete information, however. A ‘coercive cooperation’ approach addresses this problem either by imposing ex post costs through higher audience costs or offering ex ante benefits through tactical issue linkage. This paper applies a Bayesian equilibrium model to address the sequencing of these two main factors that contribute to ‘coercive cooperation’. Unlike in games with complete information, our model explains why the sender state not only resorts to international institutions but also employs unilateral countersanctions to enforce compliance in a sanctioning coalition. It is shown that international organizations offer ex ante benefits through issue-linkage while the sender state imposes ex post costs with a threat of countersanctions. When the follower state perceives the benefits to be greater than the costs, it has strong incentives to join the coalition with no substantive change in implementing measures. Once in a bandwagon, however, the sender can bring about active implementation by imposing audience costs on himself and the follower. The predictions from the model have been supported by the case study on South Korea’s non-proliferation financing regime.
Abstract
Inducing cooperation from hesitant members in a sanctioning coalition is critical for effective implementation of a financial sanction. Strategic cooperation among states with divergent interests involves time inconsistency and incomplete information, however. A ‘coercive cooperation’ approach addresses this problem either by imposing ex post costs through higher audience costs or offering ex ante benefits through tactical issue linkage. This paper applies a Bayesian equilibrium model to address the sequencing of these two main factors that contribute to ‘coercive cooperation’. Unlike in games with complete information, our model explains why the sender state not only resorts to international institutions but also employs unilateral countersanctions to enforce compliance in a sanctioning coalition. It is shown that international organizations offer ex ante benefits through issue-linkage while the sender state imposes ex post costs with a threat of countersanctions. When the follower state perceives the benefits to be greater than the costs, it has strong incentives to join the coalition with no substantive change in implementing measures. Once in a bandwagon, however, the sender can bring about active implementation by imposing audience costs on himself and the follower. The predictions from the model have been supported by the case study on South Korea’s non-proliferation financing regime.
참고문헌 (66)
- Alexander, Kern, "Extraterritorial US Banking Regulation and International Terrorism: The Patriot Act and the International Response", Journal of International Banking Regulation, 3(4), pp.307~326 (2002)
- Allen, Suan, "The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure", International Interactions, 31(2), pp.117~138 (2005)
- Alt, James, "Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis", The American Political Science Review, 82(2), pp.445~466 (1988)
- Arnold, Aaron, "The True Costs of Financial Sanctions", Survival, 58(3), pp.77~100 (2016)
- Baldwin, David, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice", International Security, 24(3), pp.801~107 (1999)
- Bapat, Navin, "Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered", International Studies Quarterly, 53, pp.1075~1094 (2009)
- Bapat, Navin, "When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework", International Organization, 69, pp.131~162 (2015)
- Bonetti, Shane, "The Analysis and Interpretation of Economic Sanctions", Journal of Economic Studies, 24(5), pp.324~348 (1997)
- Buck, Lori, "Sanctions as a Gendered Instrument of Statecraft", Review of International Studies, 24, pp.69~84 (1998)
- Butler, Christopher K., "Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(2), pp.227~250 (2007)
- Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, "On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis", American Journal of Political Science, 41(2), pp.608~618 (1997)
- Dorussen, Han, "Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(4), pp.395~426 (2001)
- Downs, George, "Reputation, compliance, and international law", Journal of Legal Studies, 31(1), pp.S95~S114 (2002)
- Drezner, Daniel, "The Sanctioning Paradox" (1999), Cambridge University Press
- Drezner, Daniel, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive?", International Organization, 54(1), pp.73~101 (2000)
- Drezner, Daniel, "All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes" (2007), Princeton University Press
- Drezner, Daniel, "Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice", International Studies Review, 13(1), pp.96~108 (2011)
- Drezner, Daniel, "Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance", International Interactions, 41, pp.755~764 (2015)
- Ekert, Sue, "The Use of Financial Measures to Promote Security", Journal of International Affairs, 62(1), pp.103~111 (2008)
- Elliott, Kimberly, "Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft" (2002), Rowman and Littlefield
- Fearon, James, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes", American Political Science Review, 88(3), pp.577~592 (1994)
- Fearon, James, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests – Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1), pp.68~90 (1997)
- Federal Register, "Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and their Supporters", Federal Register, 70(126) (2005)
- "Mutual Evaluation Report on Korea" (2009)[URL]
- Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML, "CFT Systems", Financial Action Task Force (FATF), OECD, pp.2013, ~
- Combating Proliferation Financing: A European Banking Perspective, "Ganguli, Indranil", EU, ~, pp.EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Non Proliferation Papers 24 (2012)
- Hufbauer, Gary, "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered" (1990), Institute for International Economics
- Hufbauer, Gary, "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered" (2007), Institute for International Economics
- Energy Policies of IEA Countries : Republic of Korea 2006 Review, "International Energy Agency(IEA)", IEA, 2006
- "Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Inclusion in Surveillance and Financial Stability Assessments – Guidance Note" (2012)[URL]
- Joyner, Daniel, "Non-proliferation Law and the United Nations System: Resolution 1540 and the Limits of the Power of the Security Council", Leiden Journal of International Law, 20(2), pp.489~518 (2007)
- Kaempfer, William, "Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective", International Studies Quarterly, 43(1), pp.37~58 (1999)
- Kaempfer, William, "International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator", Economics and Politics, 16(1), pp.29~51 (2004)
- Keohane, Robert, "After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy" (1984), Princeton University Press
- Kim, Tongfi, "Asymmetric Strategic Problems in Nuclear Nonproliferation", International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 14, pp.191~213 (2014)
- "Client Alert: Multilateral Sanctions against Iran"[URL]
- Krasner, Stephen, "Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism" (1985), University of Berkeley Press
- Kurizaki, Shuhei, "Detecting Audience Costs in International Disputes", International Organization, 69(4), pp.949~980 (2015)
- Lacy, Dean, "A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats", Journal of Politics, 66(1), pp.25~42 (2004)
- Lake, David, "Review Essays: Cooperation and Governance in International Relations", Review of International Political Economy, 2(2), pp.343~363 (1995)
- Loeffler, Rachel, "Bank Shots: How the Financial System Can Isolate Rogues", Foreign Affairs, 88(2), pp.101~110 (2009)
- Long, William, "Multi-Lateral Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The Emergence of a Regime?", International Peace, 4(2), pp.152~179 (2007)
- Mansfield, Edward, "Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and Sanctions", Journal of International Affairs, 48(1), pp.119~139 (1994)
- Martin, Lisa, "Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions" (1992), Princeton University Press
- Martin, Lisa, "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions", World Politics, 45(3), pp.406~432 (1993)
- Mattli, Walter, "Setting International Standards : Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?", World Politics, 56(1), pp.1~42 (2003)
- Miers, Anne, "Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success: Can Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth?", International Interactions, 28(2), pp.137~164 (2002)
- Morgan, Clifton, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises", International Studies Quarterly, 41, pp.27~50 (1997)
- Nooruddin, Irfan, "Modeling Selecting Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy", International Interactions, 28(1), pp.59~75 (2002)
- Office of Foreign Assets Control(OFAC), "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List", US Treasury Department. (April 18), ~ (2010)
- Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia Ben, "Banking on Nonproliferation", The Nonproliferation Review, 19(2), pp.241~265 (2012)
- Pape, Robert, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work", International Security, 22(2), pp.90~136 (1997)
- Passas, Nikos, "Financial Controls and Counter-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 44(3), pp.747~763 (2011)
- Poast, Paul, "Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945", International Organization, 66(2), pp.277~310 (2012)
- Powell, Robert, "In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics" (1999), Princeton University Press
- Rogers, Elizabeth, "Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts", Security Studies, 5(4), pp.43~72 (1996)
- Schultz, Kenneth, "Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy" (2001), Cambridge University Press
- Sechser, Todd, "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power", International Organization, 64(4), pp.627~660 (2010)
- Shalden Kenneth, "Globalization, Power and Integration: the Political Economy of Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Americas", Journal of Development Studies, 44(1), pp.1~20 (2008)
- Simmons, Beth, "The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation", International Organization, 55(3), pp.589~620 (2001)
- "National Report of the Republic of Korea on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540" (2004)[URL]
- Urpelainen, Johannes, "The enforcement–exploitation trade-off in international cooperation between weak and powerful states", European Journal of International Relations, 17(4), pp.631~653 (2011)
- Van Bergeijk, Peter, "Economic Diplomacy, Trade, and Commercial Policy" (1994), Edward Elgar
- Williams, Mark, "Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: The Role of the Environmental Agenda", Third World Quarterly, 14(1), pp.7~29 (1993)
- Wu, Kang, "Asia’s Energy Future" (2007), East-West Center
- Zarate, Juan, "Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare" (2013), Public Affairs