일본의 남쿠릴열도 정책 : 중앙집권적 영토정책과 일본의 다면게임

Abstract

The Japanese government's policy on the South Kuril Islands did not take a four-island restoration from the outset. Nor did it give up a four-island restoration in Abe's cabinet and switch to a two-island restoration. This study tracks changes in Japan's strategy in the Russo-Japanese negotiations on the South Kuril Islands and examines the causes. The last 70 years are divided into three periods. In the first period of generation, It was unclear whether the government was pursuing a two-island restoration or a four-island restoration in the first period. In the second period of establishment, the Japanese government established the principle of four-island restoration principle and a new identity of 'Northern Territories,' During the third period of hybrid, the Japanese government wanted to exercise some flexibility to proceed with the negotiations. However, while the government was unable to deviate from the four-island restoration principle, the time of Russian rule was prolonged and various demands and solutions from local governments and local people erupted. The situation in which the Japanese government is still unable to deviate from the principle (in a single or phased manner) reveals the problems of its territorial policy, which has been led by the state. Built on the basis of post-war patriotism, the argument of indigenous territory on the Southern Kuril Islands became a firm national policy, blending with the hostility toward the Soviet Union in the Cold War era. In response to this Japanese claim, Russia urges Japan to acknowledge "the status quo as a result of the war." While Abe is showing his willingness to negotiate, he cannot accept Russia's claim as a precondition for negotiations. The precondition is inconsistent with Japan’s sovereignty claims to Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands. The coherent logical structure that the Japanese government has been taking on three facets of territorial game militate against flexible response.