자치구 자체재원 확대의 이전재원에 대한 효과 분석

Abstract

The paper analyzes empirically the effects of an autonomous district's own revenue on intergovernmental grants in Korea. Its purpose is to present a reason why autonomous districts depend heavily on the upper-level governments fiscally and are reluctant to raise their own revenues. Summing up the empirical results, an increase in an autonomous district’s own revenue will decrease all kinds of transfers from the upper-level governments. Secondly, we show that while the effect of an autonomous district’s own revenue on transfers from metropolitan city governments is different between Seoul and other cities, its effect on transfers from the central government is not different significantly. Thirdly, the national subsidy is the most effective grant for fiscal equalization among the districts of the cities except Seoul. Fourth, the city governments are more influential than the central government for fiscal equalization among the districts in Seoul. The final and most important result is that the increase in a district’s own revenue could be more than offset by the decrease in its transfer revenues in total. It implies that we need to reform the intergovernmental transfer system to provide autonomous district governments with an incentive to raise their own revenues.