실천추론에 의한 귀납의 정당화
A Vindication of Induction by Practical Inference
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귀납추론은 연역추론이 아니기 때문에 연역적으로 정당화될 수 없다. 또한 귀납추론을 귀납적으로 정당화하는 것은 순환적이다. 따라서 흄은 귀납추론을 합리적으로 정당화할 수 없다고 주장한다. 흄이 이와 같은 귀납의 문제를 제기한 이후 오랜 동안 많은 철학자들이 이 문제를 해결하고자 시도해 왔다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 아직껏 대다수의 철학자들이 동의하는 해결책이 제시되지 않고 있다. 셀라스에 따르면 귀납의 문제는 이론추론이 아니라 오직 실천추론을 통해서만 해결할 수 있다. 이 논문은 셀라스가 제안한 실천추론에 의한 귀납의 정당화를 좀 더 명확한 형태로 발전시켜 설명함으로써 그의 해결책이 귀납의 문제에 대한 근본 해결책임을 주장한다.
Abstract
According to David Hume, a deductive demonstration for inductive inference is not possible, because inductive inference is not deductive; and an inductive demonstration for inductive inference is not possible either, because such a demonstration is circular. Thus, on his view, there is no way of justifying inductive inference. Ever since Hume raised this problem of induction, a fair number of philosophers have tried to solve it. Nevertheless there is still no solution which is plausible enough to receive wide endorsement. According to Wilfrid Sellars, we cannot justify inductive inference by any theoretical reasoning; we can vindicate it only by a certain sort of practical reasoning. In this paper, I defend this Sellarsian proposal by developing and explaining it.
참고문헌 (23)
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