정의주의에 대한 MacIntyre의 관점과 그 문제점 -<After Virtue: a study of moral theory>를 중심으로-

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to look into particularly Alasdair MacIntyre's views on the emotivism in the theories of his <After Virtue: a study in moral theory>, to find out their problems and to contribute in assisting the development of the theories of community in contemporary society. That is, I will not defend the emotivism in itself but investigate MacIntyre's views on the emotivism. The results of this study are as follows. In this brief, I am going to omit the concrete explanations of MacIntyre' theories and to present only the problems of his views. The first problem is about how correct MacIntyre's understanding about the concept of emotivism is. MacIntyre's definition of emotivism is not only ambiguous but also expands too much widely the boundary of the representatives of emotivism. The second problem is about MacIntyre's views on the emotivistic self. MacIntytre proclaims that the emotivistic self lacks any ultimate criteria because it is utterly distinct from its social embodiments and lacking any rational history of its own. But here the emotivistic self which MacIntyre states is, in fact, not different from the concept of the individualistic self. The third problem is about how proper MacIntyre's explanation about modern society is. MacIntyre describes Western society has been dominated by the emotivistic tendency from the age of the Enlightenment to the present. But MacIntyre's explanation on why the situation of obliteration of the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relationships in the social content of emotivistic social embodiments is limited only in the case of the emotional judgement not in the deliberate judgement, is not clear. And MacIntyre's explanation of rich aesthete, manager and therapist who represent the social context of emotivistic embodiments run short of consistency. Therefore, his views on the separation between the emotivistic self and its social embodiments lose the persuasive power. The fourth problem is about how properly MacIntyre presents the concept of rationality as an alternative to emotivism. MacIntyre tries various ways to create the desirable concept of rationality because he thinks the rationality based on efficiency is not different from the emotivistic position. But his endeavour is not so much successful. On the contrary, this seems to bring on the results which expose the fundamental native defects of rationality in self. The fifth problem is how proper MacIntyre's views on the separation and independence of 'morality' and the accompanying moral culture are. MacIntyre asserts the separation and independence of morality motivate the emotivistic condition. But this claim does not seem to be right. The individualistic characteristics of emotivism in MacIntyre can be regarded as formed by the influence of the religious and philosophical thought of early modern society. Therefore, on the contrary, morality after modern age has been influenced by religion and philosophy much more than past and consequencely, the characteristics of traditional communitarian morality were more shrinked thereafter. The sixth problem is about MacIntyre's views on the concept of moral culture. It is meaningful that MacIntyre recognizes the importance of moral culture phenomenon. But his views on the moral culture indicates also inadequate aspects. He describes the concept of moral culture as denoting an given academic phenomenon in the case of early modern age but on the other hand it as an ordinary moral phenomenon in relating to the present age. And MacIntyre stipulates Western moral culture after modern age consistently emotivistic and overlooks the complex and various practices of culture. The expression of individualistic moral culture seems to be more proper than the name of emotivistic moral culture designated by MacIntyre when we evaluate the culture of our own age. The seventh problem is about how well MacIntyre's teleology can be combined with his communitarian idea. MacIntyre's emphasis on Aristotelian teleology and virtue theory seems to play the desirable role for the pursue of his communitarian ideal. But because MacIntyre tried to combine the teleology with the concept of rationality in excessively exclusive way, he could not form the persuasive results. If the rationality is excessively emphasized, the interest-pursued efficiency cannot help working and this goes forward to the direction against the community spirit. That Aristotle sets up the teleology and at the same time pursues the cultivation of the good based on the virtue of community is for this reason. Lastly MacIntyre also seems to have recognized such a problem. But he does not abandon his concept of rationality continuously possessed from the beginning and instead trasfer his main idea from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas. But this transfer makes his concept of rationality more difficultly because he regresses again to the irrational sphere from which he tried to escape so long. The achievements which MacIntyre contributes to the development of contemporary communitarianism are very huge and I here do not want to disparage such his achievements. My purpose is to more investigate and supplement things needed for the theory of community he wants to develop.