The Role of Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Decision-making
0
조회
0
다운로드
2
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
In relation to moral judgment, it is the 'reasoning' and 'intuition' of human representative decision mechanism in cognitive science. The first type is intuitive and automatical way of thinking, and second is ratiocinative and reflecting one. Kohlberg asserted that the most powerful impetus comes from moral reasoning to lead moral judgment and behavior. Haidt explained that intuition plays an leading role and reasoning charges only role of post-justification, in the almost majority of moral situation, via social intuitionism model. Greene elucidates that deontological judgement is deduced intuitively by emotional response automatic and immediately, and judgment due to result does so by reasoning, conscious and reflecting cognitive reaction, through dual process theory. Kahneman maintains that humans make incomplete and irrational judgment, because they have incomplete ability of information processing inherently. To make good judgment, there are so many data to be processed, and we need to make decisions rapidly. Therefore, we use, so-called 'shortcut of judgment' of heuristic, that is, intuition. They acknowledges biased intuition as subject to overcome and upholds the effect of intuition used widely in decision-making at the same time. On the other hand, Gigerenzer claims that it does not necessarily define intuition as source of irrational bias and needs to think it as useful environmental adaptation tool box. In current moral education, the reasoning education is being utilized as core factor to enhance the ability of moral judgment. However, according to the opinions of intuitionist along with Haidt, it suggests strongly that it is not so useful the method of moral education based on reasoning in making moral judgment. This might be clearly significant challenge to moral education. It is because that it supports Haidt's argument that plays an important role for intuition resulting from emotion in moral decision making by many empirical studies recently. In this study, it argues that it guards against the view of underestimating role of moral reasoning, and reasoning could be utilized significantly in decision-making. Reasoning used in situation requiring more complex deliberation differs from intuition system used in context to make rapid decision more effectively, in its roles.
Abstract
In relation to moral judgment, it is the 'reasoning' and 'intuition' of human representative decision mechanism in cognitive science. The first type is intuitive and automatical way of thinking, and second is ratiocinative and reflecting one. Kohlberg asserted that the most powerful impetus comes from moral reasoning to lead moral judgment and behavior. Haidt explained that intuition plays an leading role and reasoning charges only role of post-justification, in the almost majority of moral situation, via social intuitionism model. Greene elucidates that deontological judgement is deduced intuitively by emotional response automatic and immediately, and judgment due to result does so by reasoning, conscious and reflecting cognitive reaction, through dual process theory. Kahneman maintains that humans make incomplete and irrational judgment, because they have incomplete ability of information processing inherently. To make good judgment, there are so many data to be processed, and we need to make decisions rapidly. Therefore, we use, so-called 'shortcut of judgment' of heuristic, that is, intuition. They acknowledges biased intuition as subject to overcome and upholds the effect of intuition used widely in decision-making at the same time. On the other hand, Gigerenzer claims that it does not necessarily define intuition as source of irrational bias and needs to think it as useful environmental adaptation tool box. In current moral education, the reasoning education is being utilized as core factor to enhance the ability of moral judgment. However, according to the opinions of intuitionist along with Haidt, it suggests strongly that it is not so useful the method of moral education based on reasoning in making moral judgment. This might be clearly significant challenge to moral education. It is because that it supports Haidt's argument that plays an important role for intuition resulting from emotion in moral decision making by many empirical studies recently. In this study, it argues that it guards against the view of underestimating role of moral reasoning, and reasoning could be utilized significantly in decision-making. Reasoning used in situation requiring more complex deliberation differs from intuition system used in context to make rapid decision more effectively, in its roles.
참고문헌 (39)
- Baron-Cohen, S., "Zero degrees of empathy : a new theory of human cruelty" (2011), Perseus Books Group
- Jeong, Beom-mo, "ducation and Pedagogy-Education" (2000), Baeyoungsa
- Buller, D. J., "Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature" (2005), MIT Press
- Gigerenzer, G., "Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World" (2000), Oxford University Press
- Haidt, J., "The Righteous Mind" (2014), Brockman
- Hauser, M. D., "Moral Minds" (2006), HaperCollins
- Kahneman, D., "Thinking" (2013), Brockman
- Kohlberg, L, "The Philosophy of Moral Development" (1981), Harper & Row
- Lapsley, D. K., "Moral psychology" (2008), Lightning Source Inc
- Pinker, S., "Mind : leading scientists explore the brain, memory, personality, and happiness" (2011), Brockman
- Rest, J. R., "Moral development: Advances in research and theory" (1986), Praeger Publishers
- Singer, P., "Practical ethics" (2011), Cambridge University Press
- Sinnott-Armstrong, W., "Moral Psychology-Vol.1: The Evolution of Morality" (2008), MIT Press
- Arkes, H. R., "Hindsight bias among physicians weighing the likelihood of diagnoses", Journal of Applied Psychology, 66, pp.252~254 (1981)
- Batson, C. D., "Prosocial motives, emotions, and behavior: The better angels of our nature", pp.15~34 (2010), American Psychological Association
- Bergman, R., "Moral development, Self, and Identity", pp.1~24 (2004), Lawrence Erlbaum Associater
- Blasi, A., "Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A Theoretical Perspective", Developmetal Review, 3, pp.201~222 (1983)
- Blasi, A., "Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development", pp.72~73 (1984), Wiley
- Blasi, A., "Moral development, Self, and Identity", pp.330~358 (2004), Lawrence Erlbaum Associater
- Gigerenzer, G., "On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky", Psychological Review, 103(3), pp.592~596 (1996)
- Greene. J., "An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment", Science, 293, pp.2105~2108 (2001)
- Greene. J., "From neural 'is' to moral 'ought': what are the moral implication of neuroscientific moral psychology?", NATUREREVIEWS∥NEUROSCIENCE, 4, pp.847~850 (2003)
- Greene. J., "The Natural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment", Neuro, 44, pp.389~400 (2004)
- Greene. J., "Moral Psychology Vol 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development", pp.36~79 (2008), The MIT Press
- Haidt, J, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment", Psychological Review, 108, pp.814~834 (2001)
- Haidt, J., "Moral Psychology 2" (2008), MIT Press
- Hannah, S. T., "Moral maturation and moral conation: A capacity approach to explaining moral thought and action", The Academy of Management Review, 36, pp.663~685 (2011)
- 박장호, "신경과학의 도덕적 직관 이해와 도덕교육", 윤리교육연구, (29), pp.137~164 (2012), 한국윤리교육학회
- Jones, T. M., "Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An issue-contingent model", Academy of Management Review, 16, pp.366~395 (1991)
- Kahneman, D., "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", pp.153~160 (1985), Cambridge University Press
- Kim, Kuk-hyun, "Description of the complementarity of the reason and emotion for neuroscience and moral educational implications", Brain, Digital, & Learning, 5, pp.1~13 (2015)
- 문경호, "도덕적 성찰학습에 대한 비판적 고찰", 도덕윤리과교육, (44), pp.287~310 (2014), 한국도덕윤리과교육학회
- Lapsley, D. K, "On dual processing and heuristic approaches to moral cognition", Journal of Moral Education, 37, pp.313~332 (2008)
- Paxton, J. M., "Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment", Cognitive Science, 36, pp.163~177 (2012)
- Shafir, E., "Reason-based choice", Cognition, 49, pp.11~36 (1993)
- Sunstein, C., "Moral heuristics, Behavioral and Brain", Science, 28, pp.531~573 (2005)
- Trevino, L. K., "Behavioral ethics in organizations: A review", Journal of Management, 32, pp.951~990 (2006)
- Tversky, A., "The Framing of Decision and Psychology of Choice", Science, 221, pp.453~458 (1981)
- 노영란, "그린(Joshua D. Greene)의 이중과정이론의 규범적 함의에 대한 고찰", 범한철학, 79(4), pp.433~464 (2015), 범한철학회