금융법상 제재의 실효성과 개선방안의 모색

Abstract

Among the recent district court judgments, conflicting judgments on similar cases have emerged. This case drew public attention in that it held the bank president responsible for the sale of the overseas interest rate-linked derivative-linked fund (DLF) that occurred in 2019. Regardless of conflicting results, the sanctions imposed by the financial supervisory authority did not work at all and the respondents were appointed or reappointed as the chairman of the financial group, raising questions about the sanctions function as a means of securing the effectiveness of financial supervisory administration. It is judged in this article that the financial supervisory authorities have already prepared and promoted a drastic improvement plan in relation to sanctions in 2015, but have not yet settled systematically and practically. First of all, it was confirmed that systematic errors occurred in the process of integrating and operating sanctions under a single sanction rule, that financial companies still rely on direct sanctions against individuals, especially against employees rather than executives, and that various effects are limited in the court's judicial review stage In response to these issues, the main conclusion is that, as in the policy advocated by the supervisory authorities, more epoch-making improvements in laws and practices are needed, focusing on sanctions on institutions rather than sanctions on individuals and monetary sanctions rather than sanctions on status. In addition, sanctions against executives are particularly subject to legal disputes and, in many cases, have no effect as a result, suggesting that a supplementary measure is needed to compensate for the loss of effectiveness due to court injunctions or prolonged trials.