主體性의 관점에서 본 茶山의 인간관

Abstract

The position of Dasan(茶山) in the history of the Theory of Human Nature(人性論) comes under the conclusion of Neo-Confucianism in Joseon (朝鮮) that closely reviewed Zhu Xi(朱熹). But, until now, embossing the aspect that his view of human beings is the opposite of Zhu Xi, the focus was only on the Theory of Nature(性說). Then, recently, the studies applying the issue of 'relationship' which is one of the main discourses of postmodernism are attempted, and the aspect of 'subject(主體)' is being embossed anew. In view of the aspect of subject, the view of human beings of Dasan emphasizes the 'subjectivity' of human beings in all aspects of value judgment, recognition of existence and moral practice. Dasan does not recognize the orientation to good which is innate in human beings and the realistic desire that hinders the orientation from being revealed as a conflict. He rather lays stress on that thanks to their existence, our minds can weigh and judge the good and the evil. This is the subjectivity of human beings in the value judgment. Next, Dasan finds the reason why human beings can be the subject of value judgment like this in Daoxan(道心). Daoxan is to request to be able to be convinced of our value judgment as Mencius did. Although this is called God's will(天命), it is only ourselves made as the other. Therefore,to recognize oneself as the subject of value judgment is the subjectivity of recognition of existence among the views of human beings of Dasan. Finally, Dasan viewed that the values and judgment of the good and the evil can be made when the value judgment and recognition of existence are practiced concretely in reality. Dasan provides human beings as an existence of relationship put in a system. Of course, this provision is not something that can be found only in Dasan but what has been maintained in the Confucianist tradition always. But, Dasan emphasized that the subject of moral practice is oneself in this relationship, and this is the subjectivity of moral practice.