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中国行政监察制度的历史演变和未来发展

The historical and future development of China’s administrative supervision system

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行政监察制度是一国行政监督体系的必要组成部分,是政府实施自我监督的重要途径之一。科学规范的行政监察制度对于规范和控制行政权力的实施,防止行政权力的腐败,维护政治廉洁,保护公共利益和公众的合法权益都具有重大意义。从中国古代到近代、现代,行政监察制度一直存在,行政监察制度具有很长的历史。1949年中华人民共和国成立以来,中国的行政监察制度经历了曲折的发展过程。大体上经过了初创期、撤销期、恢复期、逐步发展期及全面发展期。行政监察体制恢复建立后,中国积极探索在改革开放和市场经济条件下依法履行职能,加强对行政机关及其公务员进行监督的有效途径,初步形成了有中国特色的行政监察体制与经验。从而为促进行政机关及其公务员依法行政,加强行政机关公务员队伍的廉洁自律,提高行政效率,发挥了重要的作用。2010年中国对《行政监察法》做出了较大修改,但从这几年的运行情况来看,成效甚微。由于立法上、体制上等各方面的原因,行政监察制度在实践中也暴露出诸多问题,这些问题主要表现在以下几个方面:第一.行政监察机关的独立性差。在实践中行政监察机关在履行监察职能时,很容易受到同级政府以及政府内部其他工作部门的干扰。因为行政监察机关的人力、物力、财力都要受制于同级政府,因而很难摆脱同级政府的控制。第二.行政监察与纪委检查的职能交叉重叠。1993年开始,根据中央的决定,行政监察机关和中国共产党的纪律检查委员会采用合署办公模式。这一做法的目的主要是为了通过加强中国共产党对行政监察工作的领导,使行政监察和纪委检查形成合力,减少权限重叠的现象,最终提高行政监察和纪委检查的效能。然而,这一做法导致了在实践中纪委的地位不断得到发展和强化,行政监察的作用却逐渐被削弱。这种状况制约了行政监察机关的独立性和权威性的发挥。监察机关首长负责制在纪委的统一领导下难以得到落实,监察机关几乎成了纪委的附庸。第三.行政监察机关对监察案件一般无直接决定权。行政监察机关在履行完检查或调查职能以后,一般不能直接对案件作出监察决定,往往以采用提出监察建议的方式结案。监察建议或监察决定的强制执行力明显不足,对于被监察的部门和人员没有足够的威慑力。这种状况也是导致行政监察机关缺乏独立性的主要原因之一。中国行政监察制度中存在的主要问题已经制约了行政监察功能的充分、有效的发挥,这种状况不利于行政监察机关对行政机关及其公务员行使行政权力的情况进行及时、有效的监督。因而,必须克服上述问题,进一步完善行政监察制度。第一.行政监察应实行垂直领导体制。监察机关与海关等行政机关一样自成一个行政系统,下级行政监察机关只受上级行政监察机关的领导,向上级行政监察机关负责,不再接受地方人民政府的领导,从而保证行政监察的相对独立性。实行垂直领导体制后,行政监察机关的人力、物力、财力方面都应由国家统一调配和划拨,具体来说可以在各级人大审议后列入国家财政预算。这是在垂直领导体制下提高行政监察机关的法律地位,保证行政监察机关独立性和权威性,使整个行政监察制度良性运行的重要保证。第二.理顺行政监察与纪委检查的关系。现有的合署办公体制应改为1993年以前的单独办公的体制。通过实行单独办公的体制,使行政监察机关与纪律检查机关分离,避免行政监察和纪律检查权限交叉以及互相干扰各自工作的现象,从而进一步提升行政监察的独立性和权威性,使行政监察和纪律检查在各自的权限范围内发挥应有的作用。第三.依法扩大行政监察权限。赋予行政监察机关直接对公务员作出行政处分的权力。赋予监察机关直接作出“暂停有严重违反行政纪律嫌疑的人员执行职务”决定的权力。这种做法有利于公务员的违法乱纪行为及时得到处理,从而提高行政监察的效率。

Abstract

Abstract: Administrative supervision system is a necessary part of a country's administrative supervision system and it is one of the important way for government to implement self-policing. Scientific and standardized administrative supervision system is of great significance on regulating and controlling the implementation of the administrative power, preventing the corruption of administrative power, maintaining the political integrity as well as protecting the legitimate rights and interests. Administrative supervision system has a long history in China. China's administrative supervision system has experienced a tortuous development process since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 .It has experienced the initial, rescinded, convalescence, gradual development and overall development. Aggressive investigate and perform their functions according to law under the condition of the reform and opening up and market economy after the China's administrative supervision system restored. To strengthen the effective ways to supervise administrative organs and civil servants, initially formed administrative supervision system with Chinese characteristics. It has played an important role in promotingthe administrative organs and civil servants administer by law, enhancing the administrative organs of civil servants self-discipline and improving administrative efficiency. Although China has made a bigger changes to the Administrative Supervision Law in 2010, but it hasn’t significant of operation effect from these years. Because of various aspects such as legislation and system, administrative supervision system also exposed many problems in practice. In the following these problems mainly displays three respects: firstly, the independence of the administrative supervisory organs is poor, and it is easy to interference by the government and the same level of other departments within the government when the administrative supervisory organs performed their supervisory functions in practice. Because manpower and financial resources of administrative supervisory organs are limited by the government at the same level, so it is difficult to get rid of the control of the government at the same level. Secondly, the function of the administrative superintendence and discipline inspection has repetition. Administrative supervisory organs and that the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the communist party of China employ the model of the reconsideration office according to the decision of the central since 1993. By enhancingthe leadership of the communist party of China on administrative review work to form administrative superintendence and discipline inspection force to reduce the phenomenon of overlapping jurisdictions. Eventually improve the efficiency of administrative superintendence and discipline inspection. However, this approach leads to the status of the Discipline Inspection Commission development and strengthening in practice, the role of administrative superintendence is weakened gradually. This situation has restricted the independence and authority of administrative supervisory organs. Chief responsibility of system supervisory organs is difficult to be implemented under the unified leadership of the Discipline Inspection Commission, the supervisory organ almost become vassal to the Discipline Inspection Commission. Finally, Administrative supervisory organs has no direct decisions on supervision of the case. Administrative supervisory organs cannot directly make a decision on case after finish inspection or survey functions performed, case tend to adopt the way of recommendation of supervision. The case is usually in the form of giving supervision suggestions. Supervision suggestions or decide without enforcement, it does not have enough deterrent for the departments and personnel under supervision. This situation is one of the main reasons to lead to administrative supervisory organs for the lack of independence. The main problems existing in China's administrative supervision system has limited function fully and efficiently of the administrative superintendence. This situation is not conductive to the timely and effective supervision of the administrative supervisory organs exercise for administrative organs and civil servants. So we have to overcome the above problems of administrative supervision system, so as to be perfect in the future. Firstly, administrative superintendence should carry out vertical leadership system. Supervisory organs form an administrative system that administrative supervisory organs at a lower level only obey oders by the higher administrative supervisory organs, as well as shall be responsible for the higher administrative supervisory organs. It will no longer accept the leadership of the local people's governments to guarantee the relative independence of administrative superintendence. Human, material and financial resources of the administrative supervisory organs should be unified by the country allocate and transfer after the implementation of vertical leadership system. In particular it could be included in the state budget of National People's Congress at all levels after reviewed. This is an important guarantee for improving the legal status and ensuring the independence and authority of administrative supervisory organs, as well as making whole positive operation of the administrative supervision system under the vertical leadership system. Secondly, find out the relation between administrative superintendence and the discipline inspection. The reconsideration office system should be changed to separate office system befor 1993. We should separate the administrative supervisory organs and the discipline inspection organs and avoid administrative supervision and discipline inspection authority cross and mutual interference their work by the separate office system. It can enhance the independence and authority of the administrative supervision and play a proper role within their respective jurisdiction. Finally, increase the purview of the administrative superintendence according to law. Give administrative supervisory organs have the right to make administrative sanctions for civil servants and "suspend a serious breach of administrative discipline personnel from duty" directly. This kind ofpractice is advantage to the civil servants misconduct to be processed on time, so as to improve the efficiency of the administrative superintendence.

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