본문 바로가기
KERD
논문KCI 등재

좋은 기업지배구조 형성을 위한 시장과 정부의 역할

Towards Good Corporate Governance: The Role of Market Incentives and Government Policy

0

조회

0

다운로드

1

인용

0

참고문헌

키워드

주제분류경제학

초록

본 논문은 기업지배구조(corporate governance)에 대한 경제학적 관점을 제시하고현재의 한국 경제에 대한 함의를 도출한다. 전통적인 대리인 이론(agency theory) 에 따라 투자자-경영자 간 정보 비대칭으로 인한 신용제한(credit rationing) 문제를지적하고 이를 해결하는 평판, 신호, 감시 등 다양한 시장의 반응을 논한다. 시장경쟁과 가족기업은 좋은 기업지배구조의 형성을 위한 암묵적 인센티브를 유발하는 역할을 한다. 명시적 기업지배구조 정책은 시장실패를 보완할 수 있지만, 과도한 외부의 경영감시는 기업의 혁신 활동을 저해하는 등 부정적인 효과를 낳을 수 있다. 성숙하고 있는 한국 경제의 현 시점에서 기업 활동에 대한 암묵적 시장 인센티브와 명시적 정부 정책 사이의 적절한 균형을 모색할 필요가 있다.

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to provide a perspective on the economics of corporate governance and draw lessons for the current Korean economy. From the classic agency theory framework, we identify the credit rationing problem due to asymmetric information and discuss various market responses, including reputation effects, signaling, and monitoring. The role of competition and family ownership is emphasized in promoting implicit market incentives to achieve good corporate governance. While the importance of explicit legal and regulatory provisions is recognized, this paper highlights the potential danger of too much external oversight, especially for innovation. As the Korean economy matures, it must strive to strike the right balance between implicit market incentives and explicit government policy in guiding corporate activities.

참고문헌 (107)

  1. 박경서, "기업지배구조 연구의 고찰과 향후 국내관련 연구의 방향", 경영학연구, 46(3), pp.625~662 (2017), 한국경영학회[DOI]
  2. 한계기업이 우리나라 제조업 노동생산성에 미친 영향, "송상윤", BOK, ~, pp.BOK 이슈노트, 제7호 (2020)
  3. 오훈석, "기업지배구조가 재무적 경영성과와 기업가치에 미치는 영향-한국기업지배구조원(CGS) 지배구조등급의 분석을 통한 실증검증-", 기업경영연구, 18(2), pp.41~65 (2011), 한국기업경영학회
  4. 이지홍, "지식자본과 기업 생산성: 특허 자료를 중심으로", 경제논집, 58(2), pp.43~68 (2019)
  5. 이지홍, "한국 특허 패밀리 ― 데이터 구축과 분석", 지식재산연구, 15(4), pp.227~262 (2020), 한국지식재산연구원[DOI]
  6. Jihong Lee, "특허자료를 이용한 우리나라 지식전파의 지역화 분석", 경제분석, 25(4), pp.25~57 (2019), 한국은행
  7. 이지홍, "한국 특허 데이터 프로젝트: 내용과 방법", 한국경제포럼, 12(4), pp.125~181 (2020), 한국경제학회[DOI]
  8. 상품시장경쟁과 기업지배구조 관계: 카르텔을 중심으로, "이화령", KDI, ~, pp.KDI 정책연구시리즈, 제6호 (2015)
  9. 전현배, "기업의 생산성 격차와 국제화 전략", 경제학연구, 61(1), pp.5~30 (2013), 한국경제학회
  10. Radical and Incremental Innovation: The Roles of Firms, Managers and Innovators, "Acemoglu, D.", ~ (2020)
  11. Adams, R. B., "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey", Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), pp.58~107 (2010)
  12. Aggarwal, V. A., "Entrepreneurial Exits and Innovation", Management Science, 60(4), pp.867~887 (2014)
  13. Aghion, P., "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations", Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), pp.1~29 (1997)
  14. Akerlof, G. A., "The Market for ‘Lemons’ : Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), pp.488~500 (1970)
  15. Alchian, A. A., "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory", Journal of Political Economy, 58(3), pp.211~221 (1950)
  16. Aminadav, G., "Corporate Control around the World", Journal of Finance, 75(3), pp.1191~1246 (2020)
  17. Amit, R., "Handbook of Family Business", pp.157~178 (2013), SAGE
  18. Anderson, R. C., "Founding‐family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500", Journal of Finance, 58(3), pp.1301~1328 (2003)
  19. Baek, J. S., "Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the Korean Financial Crisis", Journal of Financial Economics, 71(2), pp.265~313 (2004)
  20. Balsmeier, B., "Independent Boards and Innovation", Journal of Financial Economics, 123(3), pp.536~557 (2017)
  21. Banerjee, A. V., "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), pp.989~1017 (2000)
  22. Corporate Zombies: Anatomy and Life Cycle, "Banerjee, R. N.", BIS, ~, pp.BIS Working Paper Series No. 882 (2020)
  23. Barclay, M. J., "Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations", Journal of Financial Economics, 25(2), pp.371~395 (1989)
  24. Bebchuk, L., "What Matters in Corporate Governance?", Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), pp.783~827 (2009)
  25. Beck, T., "When Arm’s Length Is Too Far: Relationship Banking over the Credit Cycle", Journal of Financial Economics, 127(1), pp.174~196 (2018)
  26. Bennedsen, M., "Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), pp.647~691 (2007)
  27. Berle, A. A., "The Modern Corporation and Private Property" (1932), Transaction Publishers
  28. Bernstein, S., "Does Going Public Affect Innovation?", Journal of Finance, 70(4), pp.1365~1403 (2015)
  29. Bertrand, M., "Mixing Family with Business: A Study of Thai Business Groups and the Families behind Them", Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), pp.466~498 (2008)
  30. Bertrand, M, "Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), pp.121~148 (2002)
  31. Bertrand, M., "The Role of Family in Family Firms", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2), pp.73~96 (2006)
  32. Besanko, D., "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets", International Economic Review, 28(3), pp.671~689 (1987)
  33. Bester, H., "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information", American Economic Review, 75(4), pp.850~855 (1985)
  34. Bhattacharya, S., "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and “the bird in the hand” fallacy", Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp.259~270 (1979)
  35. Black, B., "The Effect of Board Structure on Firm Value: A Multiple Identification Strategies Approach Using Korean Data", Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), pp.203~226 (2012)
  36. Bolton, P., "Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis", Review of Financial Studies, 29(10), pp.2643~2676 (2016)
  37. Boot, A. W. A., "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?", Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(1), pp.7~25 (2000)
  38. Brochet, F., "Accountability of Independent Directors: Evidence from Firms Subject to Securities Litigation", Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), pp.430~449 (2014)
  39. Burkart, M., "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), pp.693~728 (1997)
  40. Burkart, M., "Family Firms", Journal of Finance, 58(5), pp.2167~2201 (2003)
  41. 박경서, "How Does Product Market Competition Interact with Internal Corporate Governance?: Evidence from the Korean Economy", Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 41(4), pp.377~423 (2012), 한국증권학회[DOI]
  42. Caballero, R. J., "Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan", American Economic Review, 98(5), pp.1943~1977 (2008)
  43. Choi, J. J., "The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from Corporate Governance Reform in Korea", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42(4), pp.941~962 (2007)
  44. Coase, R. H., "Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics", pp.87~137 (1960), Palgrave Macmillan
  45. Crémer, J., "Arm’s Length Relationship", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2), pp.275~295 (1995)
  46. Diamond, D. W., "Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(3), pp.709~731 (1991)
  47. Doidge, C., "Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?", Journal of Financial Economics, 71(2), pp.205~238 (2004)
  48. Duchin, R., "When Are Outside Directors Effective?", Journal of Financial Economics, 96(2), pp.195~214 (2010)
  49. Edmans, A., "The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Vol. 1", pp.541~636 (2017), Elsevier
  50. Faleye, O., "The Costs of Intense Board Monitoring", Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), pp.160~181 (2011)
  51. Fama, E. F., "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), pp.288~307 (1980)
  52. Fama, E. F., "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), pp.301~325 (1983)
  53. Fudenberg, D., "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed", Review of Economic Studies, 59(3), pp.561~579 (1992)
  54. Giroud, X., "Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices", Journal of Finance, 66(2), pp.563~600 (2011)
  55. Gompers, P., "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), pp.107~155 (2003)
  56. Greif, A., "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition", American Economic Review, 83(3), pp.525~548 (1993)
  57. Greif, A., "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade" (2006), Cambridge University Press
  58. The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, "Hall, B. H.", NBER, ~, pp.NBER Working Paper No. 8498 (2001)
  59. Hall, B. H., "Market Value and Patent Citations", RAND Journal of Economics, 36(1), pp.16~38 (2005)
  60. Hart, O., "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme", Bell Journal of Economics, 14, pp.366~382 (1983)
  61. Xuan Tian, "Finance and Corporate Innovation: A Survey", Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 47(2), pp.165~212 (2018), 한국증권학회[DOI]
  62. Hermalin, B. E., "The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume 1" (2017), Elsevier
  63. Holmström, B., "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp.74~91 (1979)
  64. Holmström, B., "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective", Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), pp.169~182 (1999)
  65. Hörner, J., "Reputation and Competition", American Economic Review, 92(3), pp.644~663 (2002)
  66. Jaffe, A., "Geographical Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), pp.577~598 (1993)
  67. Jensen, M. C., "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp.305~360 (1976)
  68. Jensen, M. C., "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination", Journal of Business, 52(4), pp.469~506 (1979)
  69. Joh, S. W., "Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from Korea before the Economic Crisis", Journal of financial Economics, 68(2), pp.287~322 (2003)
  70. John, K., "Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium", Journal of Finance, 40(4), pp.1053~1070 (1985)
  71. Johnson, S., "Tunneling", American Economic Review, 90(2), pp.22~27 (2000)
  72. Kim, W., "Value of Outside Blockholder Activism: Evidence from the Switchers", Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(4), pp.505~522 (2009)
  73. Kreps, D. M., "Reputation and Imperfect Information", Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), pp.253~279 (1982)
  74. Kwon, S., "International Trends in Technological Progress: Evidence from Patent Citations, 1980-2011", Economic Journal, 127(605), pp.50~70 (2017)
  75. La Porta, R., "Corporate Ownership Around the World", Journal of Finance, 54(2), pp.471~517 (1999)
  76. La Porta, R., "Legal Determinants of External Finance", Journal of Finance, 52(3), pp.1131~1150 (1997)
  77. La Porta, R., "Law and Finance", Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), pp.1113~1155 (1998)
  78. La Porta, R., "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance", Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), pp.3~27 (2000)
  79. Lee, J., "Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining with Outside Options", Econometrica, 81(4), pp.1601~1672 (2013)
  80. Lee, D.W., "Does Institutional Activism Increase Shareholder Wealth? Evidence from Spillovers on Non-target Companies", Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(4), pp.488~504
  81. Leland, H. E., "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation", Journal of Finance, 32(2), pp.371~387 (1977)
  82. The Ties that Bind: Implicit Contracts and Management Practices in Family-Run Firms, "Lemos, R.", CEPR, ~, pp.CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13794 (2019)
  83. Levin, J., "Relational Incentive Contracts", American Economic Review, 93(3), pp.835~857 (2003)
  84. MacLeod, W. B., "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment", Econometrica, 57(2), pp.447~480 (1989)
  85. Machlup, F., "Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial", American Economic Review, 57(1), pp.1~33 (1967)
  86. Mailath, G. J., "Who Wants a Good Reputation?", Review of Economic Studies, 68(2), pp.415~441 (2001)
  87. Mailath, G. J., "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-run Relationships" (2006), Oxford University Press
  88. Masulius, R. W., "Independent Director Incentives: Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy?", Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), pp.406~429 (2014)
  89. Melitz, M. J., "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity", Econometrica, 71(6), pp.1695~1725 (2003)
  90. Milgrom, P., "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis", Econometrica, 50(2), pp.443~459 (1982)
  91. Miller, M. H., "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information", Journal of Finance, 40(4), pp.1031~1051 (1985)
  92. Myers, S. C., "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing", Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), pp.147~175 (1977)
  93. Reese, W. A., "Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings", Journal of Financial Economics, 66(1), pp.65~104 (2002)
  94. Romer, P. M., "Endogenous Technological Change", Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp.71~102 (1990)
  95. Schankerman, M., "Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries during the Post-1950 Period", Economic Journal, 96(384), pp.1052~1076
  96. Scharfstein, D., "Product Market Competition and Managerial Slack", RAND Journal of Economics, 19, pp.147~155 (1988)
  97. Schmidt, K. M., "Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition", Review of Economic Studies, 64(2), pp.191~213 (1997)
  98. Shleifer, A., "A Survey of Corporate Governance", Journal of Finance, 52(2), pp.737~783 (1997)
  99. Spence, M., "Market Signaling" (1974), Harvard University Press
  100. Stigler, G. J., "The Economies of Scale", Journal of Law & Economics, 1, pp.54~71 (1958)
  101. Tirole, J., "The Theory of Corporate Finance" (2006), Princeton University Press
  102. Trajtenberg, M., "A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations", RAND Journal of Economics, 21(1), pp.172~187 (1990)
  103. Villalonga, B., "How Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value?", Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), pp.385~417 (2006)
  104. Villalonga, B., "How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?", Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), pp.3047~3091 (2009)
  105. Villalonga, B., "Family Ownership", Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 36(2), pp.241~257 (2020)
  106. Williamson, O. E., "Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control", Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), pp.351~366 (1983)

관련 논문AI추천

이 간행물의 다른 논문 (3건)